Disclaimer:

This report is developed on the basis of research conducted by a team of consultants engaged by Disaster Management Programme, of Sungi Development Foundation. Mr. Muhammad Zeehan Tariq & Mr. M. H Asif of Sustainable Development Consultants (SDC) are the main authors of this report. Mr. Asad Rehman and Dr. Manzoor Ahmed Awan, reviewed the report and provided technical inputs. Design and implementation of study was coordinated and supported by Abida Swati & Rizwan Iqbal of Sungi.

The reports represents the findings, opinions, views and conclusions of the research team only and neither official nor unofficial policy of Sungi does not necessarily endorse the findings, pinions, views and recommendations expressed by the research team. The responsibility rests with the main authors and Sungi including its staff and board accepts no responsibility for this report. Sungi is publishing this report for the information purpose only.
THEY DESERVE TO BE SERVED

A study on the Current Issues and Challenges of Pakistan Earthquake-2005 Affected Communities in Pakistan

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Dr. Manzoor Ahmed Awan
Director Operations Sungi
Abbottabad
June 28, 2009
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>3R</td>
<td>Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Learning, Accountability Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Community Productivity Infrastructure</td>
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<td>DDMA</td>
<td>District Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRMP</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management Plan</td>
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<td>DRU</td>
<td>District Reconstruction Unit</td>
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<td>EDP</td>
<td>Enterprise Development Plan</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Earthquake 2005</td>
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<td>ERRA</td>
<td>Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority</td>
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<td>FCHW</td>
<td>Female Community Health Worker</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>Fiduciary Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>GOP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human and Democratic Rights</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resource</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>LFM</td>
<td>Logistic Framework Matrix</td>
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<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<td>OVI</td>
<td>Objectively Verifiable Indicators</td>
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<td>PDMA</td>
<td>Provincial Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>PERRA</td>
<td>Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>RSPs</td>
<td>Rural Support Programs</td>
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<td>SERRA</td>
<td>State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>Sungi</td>
<td>Sungi Development Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SRE</td>
<td>Search, Rescue and Evacuation</td>
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<td>Telecom</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Village Committee</td>
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<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
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<td>WATSAN</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Executive Summary

The October, 2005 earthquake (EQ) of 7.6 intensity on Richter scale devastated Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram, Shangla, and Kohistan districts in NWFP, Pakistan and Muzaffarabad, Neelam and Rawlakot districts in AJK. It left 73,336 dead, 69,412 seriously injured and nearly 3.5 million homeless over an area of 30,000 sq km in 4,000 towns and villages. 600,000 houses, 796 healthcare facilities, 6,298 educational institutions’ buildings and 6,440 km roads were destroyed or damaged. Telecommunications, Power and WATSAN were damaged up to 70%. Worst affected were women and children and other vulnerable groups.

The scale of devastation was the worst ever by a natural calamity in Pakistan’s history. It found the relevant Government agencies completely unprepared. They lacked the human, systemic and physical capacity. The Federal Government called in the Army as an emergency measure.

Sungi, a right-based advocacy organization, has been operating in the most affected districts for many years and had “worked for rehabilitation of livelihoods and health and education facilities”¹ in the past including 2004 earthquake in Mansehra and Battagram districts. This placed Sungi in a unique strategic position. It sprung into action within minutes of the EQ, formed partnerships with INGOs/donors and did massive work for rescue and relief including provision of shelter packages, food packages, transitional shelters, home accessories, livestock shelters, water and sanitation, health and hygiene services etc. Sungi also interacted with other agencies/forums to facilitate the humanitarian work. Sungi has taken many capacity building, institutional strengthening and advocacy initiatives as important elements of its strategy.

The present study proposed to assess the affectees’ present position, their own perceptions of issues, identify lessons learnt and make recommendations. It is limited territorially to Districts Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram and Muzaffarabad and the survey sample is rather small. These are its limitations. Some conclusions may have general application.

The study involved: i) desk review of secondary data, ii) questionnaire-based collection of primary data from 76 persons including 17 women hailing from 19 villages, its statistical analysis, iii) participatory meetings with 172 affectees including 47 women, iv) discussions with a large number of Sungi staff and some of the related INGOs, government agencies, and v) participation in two-day broad based conference on disaster management of delegates from all over the country.

An ADB & WB joint study in Nov. 2005 estimated the reconstruction costs at around US $ 3.5 billion of which 44% related to housing, 13% to education, 12% to transportation and 9% each on health and agriculture plus livestock. The report also articulated the guiding principles for needs assessment, and recovery strategy for all concerned to follow.

The Federal Government established ERRA on October 24, 2007 with comprehensive mandate for 3R. Practically headed by an Army General (Deputy Chairman), this body took over the work. It was mandated to play central role in coordinating/securing support from multilateral institutions, and 3R. It established two affiliate organizations, PERRA and SERRA, and DRUs for field operations in the districts. In April 2007, the Government promulgated an Ordinance providing for creation of NDMA, PDMAs and DDMAs. This law lays down a comprehensive mandate for these permanent disaster management bodies. NDMA has since taken concrete shape. However, recent crisis of IDPs has exposed the fact that PDMAs and DDMAs are still far from being functional. The Government still does not have a properly/fully functioning system to deal with devastations. It continues to rely mainly on foreign help and UN/NGOs for relief work.

The primary data about relief operations reflects that the affectees rated Sungi’s contribution among the NGOs/INGOs as the most remarkable. Over 90% respondents acknowledged its contribution. The respondents also mentioned a number of other NGOs, who participated in the relief phase. Their reach, however, was limited to some areas and sectors in the study area.

In respect of rural housing, statistical outcome of the fieldwork has revealed that 80% houses were completely and 13% partly destroyed. Army was the first to reach 46% of sample affectees and NGOs 29%, as it had had the advantage of superior resources. In 13% cases, first help arrived within 24 hours. In 36%, the time taken was 1-3 days, in 28%, it was 3-7 days, and in 23% cases it was, more than 7 days. 62% complained of delays in payment of housing installments by ERRA. 27% houses were rebuilt in up to 2 years, and 46% in 2-3 years.

The work of rural housing was huge. Initial tasks of house survey and subsequent payment of Rs.25,000 were completed quite swiftly. The policy of enforcing seismic resistant design though multiple inspections coupled with awareness campaign/capacity building in collaboration with Sungi, RSPs and other NGOs, improved quality of housing. However, there are serious areas of concern like non-transparency and mistakes in the initial survey leading to allegations of widespread corruption. The weaknesses like lack of clarity about the purpose of first payment of Rs.25,000, change in strategies and policies too often and confusion and delays in decision-making were others. The impact of limited, fixed cash assistance for all and sundry was adverse for the landless, the
tenants, and the large families. The uniform compensation package for affectees of all the areas worked against the people in the remote areas where the cost of construction was higher and prices of construction materials had flared due to sudden demand, which was not effectively controlled. The vulnerable groups including women, children, elderly, disabled and the sick were the worst sufferers of the policy as there were no protective provisions for them.

Rehabilitation of livelihood received support by default by payment of Rs. 25,000. This money was supposedly given as first installment for housing reconstruction, but more than 90% households used it as “cash for choice shopping”. It could not contribute to housing reconstruction. ERRA made a substantial payment of over Rs. 5 billion as grant to the most vulnerable based on approved criteria. There are widespread complaints, and considerable evidence, that this distribution was non-transparent, benefiting the undeserving along with the deserving, due to favourtism, nepotism and corruption. Some NGOs also provided such grants. Those were far smaller but proved to be more beneficial and resulted in improved livelihood of the marginalized particularly the women-headed households. Early recovery programmes of NGOs included considerable asset provision to the affectees, which in some cases was not appropriate and could not contribute to livelihoods improvement.

The average size of the families was 8.1, which reduced after the EQ to 7.7 due to attrition. About 85% respondents are small farmers depending mainly on agricultural produce and livestock rearing.

Queried about education, the surveyed population is convinced that their children must receive education. 70% said that before the EQ, a primary school was nearby. Most damaged schools are operating in transitional shelters. The reconstruction process is slow. There is widespread complaint about poor quality of teaching and lack of girls’ schools. 91% children (95% girls) do not have the “luxury” of playgrounds and 51% children only (30% girls) take part in sports activities.

42% respondents had a health facility nearby, but facilities are insufficient for the poor. The worst affected are women, children, and the elderly. Specialized mother and childcare facilities are virtually in shambles. For 25% it was located at a medium distance and for the remaining 33%, there was no facility at all. There in no hope of the situation reaching a reasonable level, even in the distant future. No health facilities have been reconstructed yet in the assessed rural areas; however, some of the district level hospitals have been completed, mainly by the international NGOs.

Talking about rehabilitation of infrastructure, the position is far from satisfactory. ERRA is focusing on major roads only with improved specifications and geometry. Less than 10% work is completed. Apparently, no one is carrying out the task of repairs to other roads. In case of WATSAN, ERRA reports completion of 37% schemes. The power has been restored but the meters are yet to be installed. Telecom has been restored, in fact improved, and so no one talked about it. According to ERRA, only 9% facilities were reconstructed until Sep. 2008. Obviously, the overall situation is highly unsatisfactory.
According to ERRA website, its functional sectors are Direct Outreach (Housing, Livelihood & Social Protection), Social Services (Health, Education, WATSAN), Public Infrastructure (Governance, Power, Telecommunication, Transportation and Tourism), and Cross cutting themes Disaster Risk Reduction, Environmental Safeguards and Gender Equality.

ERRA’s Annual Review 2007-08, claims that, 208,292 houses had been reconstructed including 99,247 destroyed houses and 109,045 damaged houses. Further, 349,000 houses were at various stages of reconstruction. As almost another year has since passed, ERRA must be well past the halfway stage in housing reconstruction. This goes to its credit, however subject to serious reservations, like in the case of livelihood grants, because of alleged non-transparency, corruption, nepotism, favourtism, inefficiency, delayed decision-making, frequent policy changes, ineffective grievance redressal process and inaccessibility to affectees. The decision to pay the full assistance in lump sum in Muzaffarabad is a big question mark as there is no follow up about fulfillment of the construction quality requirements. The independent report of Nov. 2007 by DFID had also rated ERRA high in respect of fiduciary risk and risk of corruption.

In case of Social services and public infrastructure, the progress is rather too slow except that Telecom stands fully restored. Power is also restored but through sub-standard methods in many areas. In remaining sectors i.e. Social Protection, Tourism, Disaster Risk Reduction, Environmental Safeguards and Gender Equality, some initiatives are reported to have been taken. However, these are, perhaps, too recent, too thin and lowly prioritized because the field survey does not provide any concrete evidence of ERRA work in these sectors.

Sungi and other INGOs and NGOs supported the 3R effort, some operating alone, and others forming partnerships. A list of such major organizations is given in Chapter 7 of the report. They added value as they brought funds as well as expertise. However, they must be cautioned about some undesirable trends like overlapping activities, lack of coordination, wastage, and partnership arrangements where some NGOs assume a contractor-like role.

Issues, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

- Taking the primary data as a whole, in the affectees’ perception, their high priority issues/needs are Roads, WATSAN, Schools (primary & Secondary particularly for women) with good delivery quality, proper healthcare facilities/hospitals (particularly mother and child care), skill development for men and women, training and support in agriculture and livestock rearing for poor farmers particularly for women, micro financing, and enterprise management.
- The input from women gives higher priority to gender-related issues on top of which is their right to learning and earning i.e. empowerment through equal educational opportunity for girls, training for skill development for girls and women, enabling independent sources of income, and better healthcare through improved health facilities at a reasonable distance particularly for mothers and babies. They want intensified advocacy work to eliminate violence against
women, women’s seclusion in the name of culture of purdah and unfair treatment in inheritance rights.

• At the second level of priority, the respondents mentioned issues like awareness programs for seismic resistant structures, urgent settlement of pending cases of compensation by ERRA and to extend the deadline, full rehabilitation of power system, playgrounds, and issues of the rural landless, irrigation channels, prevention of land sliding and the problem of low water table in certain areas.

• Civil institutions like NDMA, PDMA and DDMA must be developed immediately as living organisms to fill the pathetic institutional vacuum to manage disasters, instead of relying on armed forces too often. These bodies should start with disaster mapping and setting up early warning systems, and go on to work on all their functions, quite comprehensively listed in the NDMA Ordinance. The Governments should provide them the required resources. As part of their strategies, they should resurrect Civil Defense Organization, Boy Scouts movement and Girl Guides movement with their intrinsic strength of volunteerism and involvement of the people.

• There is a need to create a functional community based disaster management with the district, provincial and national level disaster management bodies as a strong institutional framework for disaster risk reduction and handling emergency situations.

• The stakeholders in disaster management must always faithfully adhere to the globally accepted guiding principles for recovery strategies, which are: i) rapid rebuilding of peoples’ livelihoods, ii) independence and self sufficiency, iii) subsidiarity and decentralization, iv) focus on the most vulnerable and socially disadvantaged, v) secure development gains and progress in poverty reduction, vi) restoring capacities to manage the recovery process, vii) transparency and accountability, viii) avoidance of creation of new disaster risks, ix) encouraging engagement of private sector and civil society, and v) coordinated, and coherent approaches to recovery. An important element that must be highlighted here is the principle of special attention for the most vulnerable, differently able, women, children and socially disadvantaged.

• On the pattern of War Book, a book of standing instructions should be developed for action on automatic basis by all concerned in the event of a disaster.

• Delay in rescue costs lives. The target must be to reach all affected persons at the earliest and in any case within 24 hours.

• ERRA must work faster and ensure completion of the reconstruction work by 2010-11 as envisaged.

• Issues relating to Red Zone be resolved including the delay in finalization of Master Plans giving due weight to the views of the direct and indirect affectees.

• ERRA may provide a final opportunity to all complainants of presenting their case through an independent quasi-judicial process to close the chapter, hopefully, once and for all.

• Transparency and accountability have been at a discount in the past. It must be ensured through effective institutional systems.

• The partnerships between donors, Government, INGOs and NGOs should be worked out in a manner that an employer/contractor relationship is avoided. The
donors may be able to help by adopting fast emergency procedures in crises, through simple and quick procedures for financing government and NGOs.

- Close coordination between all relief organizations is necessary to ensure optimization of resources and reach up to the remotest community. Coordination in the field is more important than at headquarters and it is dire need that all organizations shall develop union council and even the village level coordination mechanisms, to avoid duplications, exclusions and maximizing benefits through synergistic and complementary support to the affectees.

- Solutions must be found to control inferior quality of construction of public buildings. A Judicial Commission to investigate very high incidence of losses during EQ05 may be appointed as a first step in this direction.

- In the reconstruction, phase control of prices of construction material and ensuring their adequate supply is an important task that needs to be attended, to benefit the affectees and not only the contractors.

- The surveys after disaster needs to be more efficient and transparent than they normally are to minimize problems for the affectees. It is difficult to find gender segregated data on earthquake 2005 losses.

- The awareness campaign about disaster resistant construction must continue on an ongoing basis to reduce losses in future.

- The Government institutions will be more effective if they take decisions with affectees on board through an institutionalized process.

- The concept of mobile dispensaries should be implemented at a major scale as a medium term relief to the communities.

- There is a need to develop and implement a comprehensive advocacy on earthquake issues and the above recommendations shall be considered for setting priority agendas. EQ has induced positive mindset change in communities in relation to NGO’s work, status of women, their right to learn and earn, skill development, education of children including girls, efforts to improve livelihood, advocacy initiatives. NGOs like Sungi can capitalize on this change and consolidate it by appropriate and forceful interventions.

- Interventions in the agriculture sector like expert advice for growing more crops, better yield, kitchen gardening, assistance in getting better seeds, water availability, protection against vagaries of weather etc. will directly help. The Village Committees could be gradually motivated toward cooperative action as far as possible.

- Special persons-related initiatives have been initiated by some NGOs/RSPs including Sungi with support of PPAF, there is a need to scale up this programme as the numbers of persons with disabilities are rather large in EQ affected areas.

- Carry on the task of educating people about the Minimum Engineering Standards and disaster resistant construction on ongoing basis.

- Arrange, regular and reliable periodical testing of the drinking water in the communities to enhance awareness and strengthen the advocacy effort for provision of clean drinking water.

- The partnerships between donors and the local partners should be on equal footing basis instead of employer/contractor like arrangements.

- The donors must act proactively during emergencies and take decisions faster than normal.
Specific Recommendations for Sungi
In addition to the above points, following specific recommendations are made to Sungi for consideration:

- Social Mobilization is one of Sungi’s central programs, and 1396 village committees are currently reported to be active. Their gender distribution is quite balanced with 670 female, 679 male and 47 joint committees. During the field survey, 91% respondents confirmed their existence at the village level, 18% thought they were very active and 61% voted for active. Only 21% considered them partly active. With this organizational base at the community level, Sungi is already carrying out a large number of activities for well-rounded social development and is well poised to enhance them.
- In the context of right-based advocacy, Sungi should be taking forceful action in respect of the Government agencies-related points made above.
- Sungi is also well positioned to consider for advocacy and action, all the recommendations given above in the context of civil society and NGOs for expanding its noble work.
- Sungi should include in their social mobilization and advocacy programs, awareness of the importance of respect for “rights of others” and communities own responsibilities, while insisting on their rights.
- Youth should be particularly focused as an agent of social change along with the work in respect of ultra poor, the vulnerable groups and gender bias issues.
- The locally influential people should be engaged to allay their misgivings and reduce their resistance to community development efforts.
- Sungi may make the awareness programs for disaster preparedness, a permanent element of its programs.
- Sungi had already developed a data base of vulnerable households through Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) and VCs in some areas and required to update it regularly for use in emergencies.
- There is a need to further strengthen social mobilization to empower the marginalized and the women and to avoid creating another power structure behaving in the same way as the traditional feudal.
- There is a need to avoid development tourism and a culture of living within community shall be adopted, and there is a need to promote individual contacts and with maximum community members and households.
- Focus on outcomes should outweigh the number of activities. Periodic independent assessment is advisable.
- Continuous capacity building of the staff in disaster management, humanitarian principles and HAP standards must continue as an ongoing strategy.
- This is important to further strengthen accountability in humanitarian and development programmes.
- Sungi had developed a robust humanitarian response mechanism and struggling to promote community based disaster management at UC and district level, which need to be continued and further strengthened.
- There is a need to develop a strong advocacy campaign involving other civil society organizations and engaging policy makers and administration to strengthen the government disaster management system, as per National Disaster Management Ordinance 2007.
Chapter 1

Background / Context

1.1 Background

On Saturday, October 08, in the Muslim fasting month of Ramadhan, at 08.52 AM, an earthquake (EQ) of intensity as high as 7.6 on Richter scale, shook Pakistan’s NWFP province & federal capital Islamabad. It also struck Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Its epicenter was located about 100 kilometers north-northeast of Islamabad, along a fault associated with the Indian subcontinent moving northward at a rate of about 40 mm/yr and colliding with the Eurasian continent. Tremors were felt across a wide swath of South Asia, from central Afghanistan to western Bangladesh. After the EQ, thousands of aftershocks were recorded in the India-Pakistan Kashmir region, over the next many months, varying in magnitude up to 6.2 on Richter scale. The devastation that this EQ caused was arguably the worst ever by a natural calamity in Pakistan’s history.

The districts most affected by the EQ were Abbottabad, Mansehra, Battagram, Shangla and Kohistan in NWFP, and Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Neelam and Rawlakot in AJK. The magnitude of disaster was such that, according to official estimates, 73,336 people lost their lives, 69,412 were seriously injured, and nearly 3.5 million people became displaced. The total affected area was 30,000 sq. km covering 9 districts, 25 tehsils, and 4000 villages. There was widespread destruction of infrastructure and economic assets. 600,000 houses, 796 health facilities, and 6298 educational buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged. Similarly, numerous government buildings and communication structure were destroyed or seriously damaged.

The terrain in the affected areas of both NWFP and AJK was mostly mountainous comprising of scattered rural settlements, some of them as small as just two houses at the hill top. With devastation all around, land sliding and damaged roads many of these villages/settlements were not accessible. Vast majority of the affected people was living below the poverty line. Amongst them, the worst plight, for obvious reasons, was of the more vulnerable people like widows, orphans, injured, sick, elderly, women-headed families, disabled and women and children in general.

1.2 Context and Response

The relevant Government Agencies from Federal Government to the Provincial / State Government and from District Government to the other tiers of the local Governments

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2 Pakistan Earthquake 2005-Preliminary Damage and Need Assessment by Asian Development Bank and World Bank, November 12, 2005, Islamabad
3 ERRA Annual Review, 2005-06
and Tehsils administration were all woefully unprepared and unequipped to not only lead such a massive relief and rehabilitation effort but also even to coordinate it effectively. *Not a single disaster of such a magnitude ever challenged the preparedness of the Government, civil society and people at large.*

In these circumstances, the Government of Pakistan relied on the Army since it was the only reliable and disciplined force with sufficient human resource and outreach. Two military divisions were mobilized to start evacuating the injured as the top priority task and providing emergency medical aid.

At the federal level, a relief committee headed by Maj. General Farooq Ahmed was constituted to coordinate with donor countries and organizations across the world. Simultaneously, it was required to deliver properly the goods and aid being generated in and outside the country that was being consolidated by the relief committee at the Prime Minister Secretariat. This relief committee continued to oversee and coordinate implementation of relief operations across the earthquake effected areas in the two regions. The military played a critical role at this hour of need.

The Pakistani nation rose to the occasion. Organizations and individuals from all parts of the country and even from abroad, responded with spontaneity, speed and devotion to help the affected people, which was heart warming and reassuring. Besides the national NGOs, a large number of INGOs came forward with humanitarian assistance in the hour of need and suffering. The devastation, however, was so great that, notwithstanding the positive spirit, *the resources were too inadequate to meet the challenge.*

Subsequently, many bilateral and multilateral donors including The World Bank, The Asian Development Bank, and The European Community came up with their experience of dealing with similar disasters in various parts of the world. With their initial guidance, Government of Pakistan along with the Provincial Government of NWFP and State Government of AJK came forward to set up an umbrella organization for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affectees. Socio-economic surveys were conducted and after intense consultations with knowledgeable people, NGOs, and INGOs the Government established Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

An effort initiated by the donors jointly led to benchmarking of the widespread disaster across various sectors identified by the Governments and Donors including housing, livelihood, agriculture, education, health etc. This provided the basis for the first set of estimates, which led to a detailed assessment. The final estimates were taken up and the Government pledged funds in the donors’ conference.

ERRA supported establishment of State Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (SERRA) with the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and NWFP Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (PERRA) with the Government of NWFP. While implementation part of most of the reconstruction components were left to these regional bodies, Federal ERRA played the central role of strategic planning, capacity building, setting roadmap for implementation and also facilitated in setting up standards and processes for reconstruction, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. ERRA
also facilitated the NGO-DONOR-GOVERNMENT coordination, which played an important role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation carried out so far. However, still a lot of ground is to be covered.

Significant progress has been made in the housing sector through a structured and phased approach. While funding was provided in installments against agreed milestones between the affectees and the Government, trainings were imparted by the ERRA engaged consultants / trainers along with army and the civil society, to the affectees for reconstructing their houses. Work of rehabilitating/reconstructing of the education and healthcare units is still ongoing.

Livelihoods including agriculture & livestock, tourism, other services have been restored to a significant extent with the active participation of community, which has been mobilized, largely by the civil society / NGOs. Sungi has played a major role in the whole process.

Some big projects like BALAKOT CITY are yet to pick momentum and infrastructure, large and small, requires more concerted efforts to be dovetailed with active community participation, and resultantly their ownership, not only in planning and development phase but also to ensure the sustainability of these interventions.

1.3 Sungi’s Role

Sungi, a right-based advocacy organization had been active in the affected area for about 18 years and had been involved in rehabilitation of livelihoods and health and education facilities after earlier disasters in the area including 2004 earthquake in Mansehra and Battagram districts. Its long presence and experience of the area gave it a unique strategic position to play a major role. It reacted fast, within minutes of the tragedy, and proactively participated in the Herculean task. It worked with the support of various partners, like Oxfam Novib, Norwegian Embassy, Oxfam GB, UNDP, CIDA, CHF Canada, Care, Save the Children, UNICEF, and a number of individual philanthropists from Pakistan and abroad. It made significant contribution in rescue, relief and rehabilitation work. Its massive contribution included, provision of shelter packages, food packages, transitional shelters, home accessories, livestock shelters, water and sanitation, health and hygiene services etc. Sungi also provided coordination and field information to humanitarian actors during the early weeks of the disaster, and played a proactive role in advocating the affectees’ rights together with other civil society actors. Contributed significantly in development of ERRA strategies particularly; housing, gender and social protection. In fact, the EQ precipitated deliberate modification of the scope of Sungi’s programs and strategies. Sungi has since taken many capacity building and institutional strengthening initiatives as a permanent element of its strategy and has decided to continue playing an active role in disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction (3R) on an ongoing basis.
1.4 Rationale of this Study

After about three and a half years of the EQ, Sungi has commissioned this study with the core purpose to determine what has been achieved because of humanitarian response by various bodies.

Sustainable Development Consultants (Pvt) Limited was entrusted with this study. It has been conducted through field surveys in selected union councils / villages at household level, complimented by collection of secondary data including reports, their desk review and data analysis, and by conducting various group discussions with the NGOs, Sungi officials including field staff, local communities etc.

We are grateful for the professional enthusiasm demonstrated by the Sungi officials during the course of this assignment and their valuable contributions including facilitation of group discussions, surveys and provision of various reports and data. In particular, the contributions of Dr. Manzoor Ahmed, Director Operations; Shaikh Asad Rahman, Director Programs; Ms. Abida Swati, Program Coordinator and Mr. Rizwan Iqbal Moghul, Program Coordinator are sincerely appreciated.

This report is a direct contribution of the work done by the authors and reviewers, Messers M. H. Asif and Mr. Muhammad Zeeshan Tariq, supported by M. Asad Khan and M. Saeed Khan for data collation and compilation, and other field and secretarial staff of Sustainable Development Consultants (Pvt.) Limited.
This study to benchmark the issues of 2005 earthquake affected communities and the way forward has been commissioned in May 2009 by Sungi. This organization's strength lies in its well-developed linkages at the grass root level with the local communities, nurtured over several years of sustained interaction and advocacy. Currently, Sungi is running the following programs:

- **Good Governance and Democratization (Social Mobilization, Human and Democratic Rights, Advocacy), Sustainable Livelihoods (Natural Resource Management, Microfinance and Enterprise Development)**
- **Social Sector Development (Health, Education, Community Productive Infrastructure)**
- **Disaster Management**
- **Human and institutional development and gender mainstreaming cutting across all the other programs**

Apart from various other activities that Sungi performed over the years, it has prepared and publicly circulated many reports on earthquake response by the organization, financial details, assessment of village profiles, and other independent reports.

### 2.1 Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are:

- **to assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in rehabilitation and reconstruction;**
- **to assess local government’s role for rehabilitation of earthquake 2005 affectees;**
- **to assess whether ERRA’s policies and practices on ground are relevant and effective in communities’ perspective;**
• to assess immediate outcomes of work done/interventions carried out during 2005-2009 in the lives/well being of the earthquake affectees because of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives; and

• to assess current issues/problems of the communities and their priority needs for next 5 years.

2.2 Terms of Reference (ToR)

The Terms of Reference is provided at annex-I. The analysis presented in this report along with the conclusions and recommendations are based on the secondary and primary data gathered during this study. Field based surveys were conducted and group discussions with various stakeholders and at various stages were held. However, there are certain limitations attached to the outcome:

a. The sample size, though meaningful to get a fairly good idea of the situation on ground, is not large enough and wide enough in terms of geographical coverage, to comprehensively cover all the details of the earthquake, the effects, efforts by all and results along with a clear demarcation as to what more is to be done and by who. Despite the limitation, effort was made by both SDCP and SUNGI to have as wide a spread as possible in the given timelines.

b. Far flung areas where road access was a problem, in particular the communities at certain hilltops could not be covered.

c. Law and Order in parts of the NWFP, also limited the movements in some of the districts of NWFP. Even though coverage was ensured geographically, there has also been movement of local communities in and out of these areas due to the security situation and results/outcomes may have been affected due to the reason.

d. Another important limitation must be specifically stated. This study’s geographical extent is confined to four districts of Abbottabad, Mansehra, and Battagram in NWFP, and Muzaffarabad in AJK. Nevertheless, many conclusions drawn from this sample could have a general application.

In the course of study, following cross cutting dimensions are also considered:

1. Communities’ Livelihoods Framework based on Sustainable Livelihoods
2. Accountability Mechanisms at all levels
3. Consideration of Gender aspects and vulnerable groups at all levels.

2.3 Study Methodology

Essential elements of the agreed methodology were:
• **Preparation of a work plan** and agreement with SUNGI for its implementation identifying all major activities.

• **Collection and Desk Review of Secondary Data:** including websites and various reports generated by various relevant organizations including Sungi, ERRA, WB, ADB, ALNAP etc. and legal instruments laying down the roles of the related Government organizations.

• **Designing of instrument (questionnaire)** for primary data collection from the affectees covering all aspects of the study.

• **Collection and collation of primary data through field visits including questionnaire based, interview of about 80 affectees in about 8 villages (10 households each)** aiming to gather quantitative and qualitative information.

• **Participatory Group Discussions/Interviews/consultation with community and civil rights groups, INGOs and NGOs, local and federal Government agencies etc.,** based on structured or semi-structured questionnaires aiming to gather quantitative and qualitative information.

• **Check for quality assurance of data at collation stage**

• **Data entry (into MS Excel) of the primary data gathered** by the consultants and their support staff.

• **Generation of data reports for** qualitative and quantitative analysis for serving the Terms of Reference adequately.

• **Discussions with the SUNGI officials at various stages.**

• **Visited numerous related reports and data obtained from various sources including through personal visits, through information web portals and from implementation partners.**

• **Participation in a two day conference on “Lessons Learnt in Disaster Management – Peoples Perspective” at Islamabad, which was attended by Sungi and its local partners in all four provinces of Pakistan as well as affectees of EQ2005, earthquake of 2008 in Balochistan, flood affected areas in Sindh and Punjab and the recent man-made disaster in NWFP displacing millions of people.**

• **Data analysis and report writing followed by a QA through a peer review.**
2.4 Field Survey, Affectees’ Interviews and Participatory Focal Group Discussions

Briefly, the following group discussions and individual interview sessions were held in the field:

**District Muzaffarabad**
- Village Sehri in Union Council Langarpura, Tehsil and District Muzaffarabad. This was one of the most EQ affected remote villages in the area, located at an altitude of about 3600 ft. above sea level. It is accessible through partly unpaved and partly shingles hilly and hazardous roads. 23 persons including 7 women were consulted.

- Village-Haryalla in Union Council Kaimanja of Tehsil and District Muzaffarabad. This village at an altitude of about 4600 ft. is even more remote than Sehri, and more hazardous to reach. 42 persons including 20 women attended the meeting. Some of them actively participated in the discussion but most did not even though they were encouraged to speak their mind.

**District Battagram**
- In Battagram, NWFP, for security reasons, it was not considered prudent by local Sungi management to visit a remote area due to law & order situation prevalent in the region. However, residents from a cluster of villages gathered at a central place. 17 persons attended the meeting. It was an all male group, as in this conservative society the practice of segregation persists. It was noticeable here that the well-to-do, middle and poor all three classes were represented. The class interests mean different perceptions and that led to heated discussion, bringing out various aspects of the issues involved.

- Had a detailed discussion with representatives of various villages from Union Council Battagram in Sungi’s Battagram office. This provided an opportunity to get a wide-angle view of the affected villages of Battagram. It was, again an all male meeting with 18 persons.

**District Mansehra**
- In Mansehra, again, there were grave security concerns and since it was harvesting season, the population was quite busy. Notwithstanding these negative factors, it was possible to talk to 34 persons including 13 women at a central place in Tehsil Mansehra where 9 villages were represented. These villages are located relatively near the city of Mansehra and represented the peculiarities of such near city areas.

**District Abbottabad**
- In Abbottabad District, Akhora a far-flung village near Nathia Gali at a high altitude of about 6500 ft was visited. Here, a gathering of 38 including 17 women was present. The women participated in the discussion. The day’s program included visit to another remote village in this hilly area but due to sudden change of weather for
the worse, it was thought that the venture would be too risky and had to be abandoned.

- **Overall, the Consultants were able to hold discussions with 172 affectees, 47 women and 125 men, in this five continuous days’ field visit programme. They came from 19 villages in the 4 districts. The consultants could also conduct questionnaire-based interviews with 76 persons including 17 women and 59 men, from 19 villages.**

- In Chapter 5, the perceptions of these affectees will be discussed at length identifying, in the process, their issues, the core purpose of this study. While doing so, the issues will also be analyzed in depth taking into account various aspects as well as other stakeholders’ views, and recommendations will be developed.
Chapter 3

Estimates of Devastation

3.1 Conditions before the EQ

Before getting into the detailed analysis & discussion of perceptions of the affectees, and their issues, it is appropriate in the context of the present study that the condition obtaining in the affected area before the EQ and an estimate of the devastation as well as the reconstruction costs are given. First authentic information that is available on the subject is in the joint report by ADB & WB dated November 12, 2005, which means that it was prepared within 36 days of the EQ. This report documents the conditions in the EQ affected areas, as follows.

CONDITIONS IN AFFECTED AREAS BEFORE THE EARTHQUAKE

The area most heavily damaged by the earthquake incorporates AJK and the eastern Districts of NWFP. This region is home to a scattered population of some 5.7 million people. The social structure in this region is closely-knit, and families on average comprise 7 people per household. About 88 percent of residents live in hilly, mountainous rural settlements, which range in size from 2 households to more than 300. The region’s population is relatively young: nearly half (42 percent) of the population is below the age of 15 years, while 6.7 percent of the population is above the age of 60. A high proportion of the population lacks basic services and facilities like clean drinking water and safe disposal of waste. The region is also an area of extreme environmental vulnerability, characterized by frequent landslides and unchecked urban development with few environmental safeguards.

Agriculture and livestock rearing are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. Most rural residents engage in subsistence agriculture, with agriculture accounting for 60 to 70 percent of total household income and 37 percent of total rural employment. Public administration accounts for a significant proportion of employment in the affected urban areas; followed by small trading and businesses, construction and transport, mostly in the informal sector. Employment in public administration is especially prominent in AJK, and agriculture conversely employs a higher fraction of the rural population in NWFP. Notably, for all affected areas, remittances from migrant male family members are a vital source of income. Options for women to become employed outside of the household are very limited, even though, due to labor migration, the proportion of women-headed households is fairly high. In AJK, for instance, approximately 20 percent of households are headed by a female
Overall, the private sector in the affected areas is largely dominated by medium, small-scale and unregistered enterprises, often household-based. The region’s manufacturing and financial sectors are small and offer few employment opportunities. Mounting population pressures and land fragmentation have overburdened subsistence agriculture, spurring widespread seasonal migration to urban centers and abroad. Remittances are thus an important source of income and account for approximately a quarter of household’s consumption expenditure, even for the poorest quintiles in AJK and NWFP.”

3.2 Estimates of Devastation

The ADB and WB joint report contains preliminary estimate of total losses and reconstruction cost as under:

“Preliminary Estimate of Total Losses and Reconstruction Costs as of November 10, 2005:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Direct Damage (Rs. mill.)</th>
<th>Indirect Losses (Rs. mill.)</th>
<th>Reconstruction Costs* (Rs. mill.)</th>
<th>Reconstructi on Costs* (US$ mill.)</th>
<th>Share of Total Reconst. Costs (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Housing**</td>
<td>61,220</td>
<td>7,218</td>
<td>92,160</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>7,114</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>18,012</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>19,920</td>
<td>4,133</td>
<td>28,057</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,985</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>2,971</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>4,254</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Physical Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport**</td>
<td>20,165</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>24,699</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>324</td>
<td></td>
<td>623</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy, power &amp; Fuel</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Economic Sectors****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Livestock</td>
<td>12,933</td>
<td>6,770</td>
<td>17,846</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Services</td>
<td>8,578</td>
<td>8,379</td>
<td>9,178</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total= 1+2+3 (in Rs. Million)</td>
<td>135,146</td>
<td>34,187</td>
<td>208,091</td>
<td>3,503</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w: Azad Jammu &amp; Kashmir</td>
<td></td>
<td>76,375</td>
<td>17,671</td>
<td>116,625</td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
<td></td>
<td>58,771</td>
<td>16,516</td>
<td>91,467</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w: Public Assets</td>
<td>48,131</td>
<td>12,175</td>
<td>82,187</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Private Assets</td>
<td>87,015</td>
<td>22,012</td>
<td>125,904</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w : Urban Areas</td>
<td>26,490</td>
<td>13,675</td>
<td>46,163</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Rural Areas</td>
<td>108,656</td>
<td>20,512</td>
<td>161,928</td>
<td>2,726</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Includes cost of reconstruction of both immovable and movable assets and restoration of public services.
** Includes value of household contents such as consumer durables; reconstruction costs exclude replacement of these assets.
*** Includes roads and bridges.
**** Total losses and reconstruction costs in agriculture, industry and services are over and above what is accounted for by the sectors listed above.”
3.3 Guiding Principles for Need Assessment and Recovery Strategy

The ADB, WB joint Report went on to state, “the assessment team has used ten points as a basis for its analysis in the needs assessments and proposed recovery strategies by sector. These points emerged from a realization that moving from the relief phase toward comprehensive recovery that meets the needs of the affected population requires a common framework; to be adopted by all organizations and institutions involved, to ensure speed, consistency and equity across rehabilitation efforts. These guiding principles for needs assessment and proposing recovery strategy were formulated by the international development partners and outline key areas that may be shared and adhered to by all parties when planning and implementing recovery activities. These are:

- **Rapid rebuilding of people’s livelihoods.** Accelerate the revitalization of the local economy – revival of production, trade and the creation of income and employment opportunities in support of people’s own initiatives.

- **Independence and self-sufficiency.** Maximize use of local initiative, resources and capacities. Base planning and execution on local knowledge, skills, materials and methods, and enterprise, taking into account the need for affordable solutions. Ensure community participation in all aspects of the recovery process and partner with local institutions.

- **Subsidiarity and decentralization.** Take decisions on plans, design and implementation at the lowest level possible, to ensure community ownership and empowerment, and to ensure solutions are locally appropriate.

- **Focus on the most vulnerable and socially disadvantaged groups, such as children, women, and the disabled.** Disasters increase the vulnerability of all, but especially of those who are already disadvantaged. Recovery programming needs to give priority to the most vulnerable groups, including female-headed households, children and orphans, and the poor, and take account of those with special needs, to avoid their being overlooked.

- **Secure development gains and progress in poverty reduction.** Disasters can reverse hard-won gains in poverty reduction and development, risking a downward spiral of decline. Recovery planning must attempt to re-establish and secure previous development gains. In addition, the poor in areas not affected by the disaster (the vast majority in the case of Pakistan) should not lose out due to increased allocation of public resources to the earthquake-affected areas at the expense of the rest of the country. Ensuring the dual objectives of rehabilitating and rebuilding earthquake affected communities and accelerating Pakistan’s development will require additional resource mobilization by Pakistan and the international community.

- **Restoring capacities to manage the recovery process.** The capacity of local public administration, including infrastructure, must be rebuilt. Along with local and national institutions, encourage and empower all levels of civil society to participate in and manage the recovery process.
• **Transparency and accountability.** Achieve accountability through ensuring the effective operation of the judicial system. Achieve transparency through open processes and wide dissemination of information on all aspects of the recovery process.

• **Avoid the creation of new disaster risks.** While avoiding radical redesign and restructuring of neighborhoods and towns, ensure that sensible and realistic measures are taken to achieve development progress, protect the environment, and reduce future disaster risks.

• **Encourage engagement of private sector and civil society.** Mobilize private investment – both human and financial. Ensure the local private sector has incentives and technology to participate fully in reconstruction and that financial and human contributions from companies and individuals, as well as wider Pakistani Diaspora beyond Pakistan, are harnessed.

• **Coordinated and coherent approaches to recovery.** Ensure full and effective coordination among all involved agencies based on comprehensive information exchange, flexibility in administrative procedures, and surveillance of any rent-seeking activity during implementation, and uniformity of policies”.

### 3.4 Physical Dimensions of Devastation

To appreciate the physical dimensions of the devastation, following facts per Annual Review 2005-2006 of ERRA, as updated in September 2006, are given below:

| Educational institutions destroyed | 6,298 |
| Health units destroyed             | 796   |
| Houses destroyed                   | 500,000 |
| Roads damaged                      | 6,440 km |
| Telecommunication, Power, Water and Sanitation | 50-70% |

Chapter 4

Government Response

4.1 Perspective

When the EQ hit in October 2005, the legal framework available to Government of Pakistan was The West Pakistan National Calamities (Prevention and Relief) Act, 1958. Its preamble states: “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the maintenance and restoration of order in areas affected by certain calamities and for the prevention and control of and relief against such calamities”. This law applies to “whole of West Pakistan except the Federal Capital and the Special Areas”. Under this law, the Government is empowered to declare any area as calamity affected area and appoint a Relief Commissioner on whom may be conferred all the powers that are considered necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act Under this Act, the Government may frame Rules. Standing Instructions for the utilization of Government Grants for relief under this Act also existed. The Government went ahead and appointed a Relief Commissioner two days after the EQ, on 10\textsuperscript{th} October 2005 at the Federal level. In the field, at the operational level, it was for the local governments to gear themselves up and face the challenge. Civil Defense Organization has always been a part of the local set up and it was designed to be prepared for relief work in emergencies. It also was required to train able bodied and willing civilian volunteers in rescue and relief work. However, over time, the Civil Defense Organization has decayed to the extent of being practically non-existent. The apparent reason is that its utility has been forgotten and it has been starved of resources. In fact, over time, the local governments/administrations appear to have completely forgotten that disaster management is one of their many important functions.

When the EQ2005 struck, local governments were completely unprepared to deal with the disaster that it left in its wake. No doubt, this disaster was of such magnitude that even a moderately prepared local government would have been unable to tackle it without major extraneous help, yet complete absence of local capacity cannot be justified and is something that must be taken note of. Why these civilian structures have become so ineffective is something one would like to examine and find out.

4.2 Response

Faced with the enormity of the task, Army was called in immediately. It started the evacuation of injured, saving lives being of paramount importance. The Government also issued appeal to the international community for assistance. Some 85 bilateral and multilateral donors, over 100 NGOs and the private sector organizations came forward to participate in the relief operation. In the PM Secretariat, a coordination office for
rescue and relief started to function. The United Nations deployed its Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to assess the scale of disaster, provide technical assistance and help manage the international response. The institutional vacuum, however, continued.

4.3 Establishment of ERRA

On October 24, 2005, the Government established Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) through a notification. It has since been playing central role in 3R. ERRA has been discussed in detail in chapter 6.

4.4 NDMA Ordinance 2007

On April 07 2007, the Federal Government has promulgated the National Disaster Management Ordinance, 2007. Under this law, provision has been made for establishing The National Disaster Management Commission. It is designed to be a high-level body with Prime Minister of the country as the Chairperson.

It also provides for the establishment of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), by the Federal Government and Provincial as well as District Disaster Management Authorities in order to take care of all aspects of the situation in the event of a disaster. It goes on to provide for a National Institute of Disaster management, responsible for planning and promoting training and research and developing core competencies in the area of disaster management and such relate matters. It also provides for a National Disaster Response Force but does not give much detail of this force except that its control, direction etc. will vest in NDMA.

4.5 Powers and Functions of NDMA

The law articulates the powers and functions of the NDMA in detail, which will bear being reproduced here, being quite a comprehensive agenda for disaster management. It should be of interest to those interested in the subject.

“Powers and functions of the National Disaster management Authority.—The national Authority shall:

a) Act as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management;

b) Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National Commission;

c) Implement coordinate and monitor the implementation of the National policy;

d) Lay down guidelines for preparing disaster management plans by different Ministers or Departments and the Provincial Authorities;
e) Provide necessary technical assistance to the Provincial Governments and Provincial Authorities for preparing their disaster management plans in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Commission;

f) Coordinate response in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster;

g) Lay down guidelines for, or give directions to the concerned Ministries or Provincial Governments and the Provincial Authorities regarding measures to be taken by them in response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster;

h) For any specific purpose or for general assistance requisition the services of any person and such person shall be a co-opted member and exercise such power as conferred upon him by the Authority in writing;

i) Promote general education and awareness in relation to disaster management; and

j) Perform such other functions as the National Commission may require it to perform

National Plan, -- (1) There shall be drawn up a plan for disaster management for the whole of the country to be called the National Plan.

The National plan shall be prepared by the National Authority having regarding to the national policy and consultation with the Provincial governments and expert bodies or organization in the field of disaster management, and approved by the National Commission.

The National Plan shall include—

a) Measure to be taken for the prevention of disasters or the mitigate on of their effects;

b) Measures to be taken for the integration of mitigation measures in the development plans;

c) Measures to be taken for preparedness and capacity building to effectively respond to any threatening disaster situations or disaster; and

d) Roles and responsibilities of different Ministries or Divisions of the federal Government in respect of measures specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c).

The National plan shall be reviewed and updated annually.

The federal Government shall make appropriate provisions for financing the measures.
- **Guidelines for minimum standards of relief**—Subject to directions of the National Commission, the National Authority shall lay down guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by disaster which shall include,—

  a) the minimum requirement to be provided in the relief camps in relation to shelter, food, drinking water, medical cover and sanitation;

  b) the special provisions to be made for vulnerable groups;

  c) ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses and for restoration of means of livelihood; and

  d) Such other relief as may be necessary.

**Relief in loan repayment, etc.**—Subject to such directions as the National Commission may give; the National Authority may, in cases of disasters of severe magnitude give directions regarding relief in repayment of loans or for grant of fresh loans to the persons affected by disaster on such concessional terms as may be appropriate.

### 4.6 Status of Institution Building

The proof of the pudding however is in eating. What will matter is how the institution develops, how long will it take to be effective on ground and how effective it eventually will be. After more than 2 years of the promulgation of the law, the present position is that **NDMA has been established** and has necessary professional staff of about 25 persons. However, this does not mean that a national disaster management system is functional and capacity to deal with a disaster has come into being. That is very different. The **PDMAs in the provinces are either still not functional or are not geared to tackle a disaster.** To illustrate, the PDMA Balochistan was not in a position to deal with the disaster caused by the earthquake of 2008 in Ziarat and other nearby places. The same is the case in relation to the unprecedented IDP crisis of 2009. Suffice it to say that this matter is nowhere on any of the Provincial Government’s priority list. As regards DDMAs, the present situation is that no permanent structure is envisaged. These are/will be more like committees of district officers without any specific resources at their command for disaster management. Perhaps, they are expected to find resources from other functions for which they are responsible. The Governments’ knee jerk response to any disaster, routinely, is to seek foreign help and rely on INGOs and NGOs for the relief work.

There cannot possibly be a more glaring example of *ad hoc* decision making, lack of vision and apathy when it comes to the common person’s life and security. For the present study, it is not necessary to go into the reasons for such inordinate delay even after the harrowing experience of EQ 2005. The excerpt from the law has been included only because it is a comprehensive agenda for disaster management. The position now is that **the legal foundation is laid and whenever the Governments in the provinces get convinced of the need to create capacity for disaster management, they can take the required executive decisions without any difficulty.**
The core of this study is determining the perceptions of the affectees, and identifying and analyzing their issues with a view to developing recommendations. This chapter will take care of it. The primary data gathered in the form of responses to the questionnaire and the input received during the Focal Group discussions will be analyzed taking into account all relevant facts and aspects.

5.1 Housing

The analysis may start with rescue and relief work. However, after three and a half years, it seems appropriate to first discuss housing, a basic need, and more important in the present context. A number of questions were posed on this subject from the affectees, and their responses are discussed below.

The respondents were asked whether their houses were partially damaged, or partially destroyed, or completely destroyed. The summary of responses is given in diagram 1.
In numerical terms, 80% claimed that their houses were completely destroyed, 13% claimed partial destruction, and 7% partial damage. It is important to mention here that although most of the localities surveyed were in the severely affected areas, there were others, which are known to have not been so severely hit. There, however, was a visible tendency to exaggerate the loss. The reason for this attitude is not hard to find. Partly, it may be owing to weak moral fibre but mostly it emanates from the deep suspicion in our communities about the manner in which the Government authorities would do their decision-making. A general strategy is to err in one's own favour “to be on the safe side” as they like to put it.

To the question whether the affectees shifted from their village to a camp, another locality or town, 80% informed that they did not leave their village. 15% shifted to a nearby locality, 3% to some other town and 2% to a temporary camp.

Bulk of the sample population opted to stay in the village, make some temporary arrangement, wait for the help to arrive and in the meantime, self manage the devastation at the community level.

To the question as to who was the first to reach for their help after the EQ, the responses were as in Diagram 2

![Diagram 2](image)

It is quite clear that in almost half of these remote villages, typically, Army personnel were the first to arrive initially for rescue/relief and later for first assessment of housing damage. In the course of group discussions, it was mentioned that the Army/ERRA personnel were accompanied with local Revenue Department officials like Patwari and in some cases with the local councilor.
Some of them complained that, in the initial damage assessment, a number of houses were left out particularly if the owner/occupant was not present. Accusing fingers were also raised by some against the Revenue officials and the councilors. The affectees complained that the personnel were not certain if the registration/counting had to be related to the existence of a house or the number of families living therein. They were also not clear if the names of tenant occupants should or should not be registered. It seems that different teams in different areas had different understanding resulting in inconsistent registration. In Battagram, the owners complained that that registration of the names of tenants (Muzaray) caused serious complications in social relations and bitter disputes.

The next related question was about the time taken by the first party to reach the spot, and the responses are given in Diagram 3.

![Diagram 3](image)

It is quite obvious that a vast majority of the respondents were on their own for at least three days. This period was more than 7 days in many cases. **In extreme cases, no help reached even after 3 weeks. This is an important point to ponder while firming up contingency plan to deal with disasters in future.**

74% respondents confirmed that they had received the first payment of Rs. 25,000 from ERRA. However, quite a few points need to be analyzed in this regard in light of discussions with the community as well as other stakeholders, and also responses to other questions related to reconstruction of the houses. Before dilating upon them, the responses to other related questions are being given.
To the question: “Did you receive the installments for reconstruction of the house timely?” the response is illustrated in **Diagram 4**

Another related question was:” Did you receive any training from ERRA for reconstruction of your house?” the response was negative from 51% respondents, positive from 33% and remaining 16% stated that it was insufficient.

To the concluding question on the subject of housing as to how long did it take to rebuild the house after the earthquake, the response was as given in **diagram 5. It was explained to them that completion meant that the roof was in place even if some other needs were unmet.**
Looking at the above response pattern to the questions related to housing and taking into account the discussions with the community as also with other stakeholders, the following observations are made:

a) At the time of initial survey of damage to houses, the Army personnel appear to have relied heavily on the Revenue Department officials and the local councilors in some areas. There were complaints that many of those who were not physically present at that time, for any reason, were ignored. The worst affected were the most vulnerable ones like women-headed families, the elderly, the widows, the disabled, orphaned children etc. and the assessment teams excluded most of the women headed and other vulnerable households. Accusations of willful wrong recording were also made by some. The errors in recording correct particulars i.e. name, father/husband’s name, N.I.C. No. etc. on site or later in computer data entry resulted in protracted difficulties in issue of cheques or their encashment. These are some of the seemingly minor matters, which can be avoided with a little extra care and save a great deal of trouble to the affectees and bad name to the officials and the departments. The Army officials, with no or little previous experience of this kind of work, appear to have leaned heavily on the civilians. Most of this could perhaps have been avoided by being more proactive. **It needs to be remembered that highest accuracy needs to be aimed at in creating initial master record in any computerized operation. This is a rather basic but important lesson learnt.**

b) The evidence suggests that first payment of Rs. 25,000/- was made quite swiftly to almost every one who was registered. However, at that point in time, even all ERRA officials were not aware, or were not sure if this was the first installment towards house reconstruction or immediate relief. Almost every one, who
received, used this money for what was perceived as immediate need. Most of the relief items were available in plenty in most areas by the time this money was delivered and due to this lack of certainty/clarity about the purpose of this payment; it was wasted by many on choice shopping or activities some of which could be postponed. A participant in the discussions pointed out that a large number of recipients’ first act was to buy a cellular phone. It certainly must have been a morale booster but that alone would not justify it. Most of the cheques were received by the men and were mainly used by them shopping items relevant to their own needs, excluding women and children to benefit from this grant to a large extent. This money was also used in hiring vehicles by men to visit offices of relief agencies and the government authorities. The lesson learned here is that the process of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction needs to be decided and documented in normal times, not after the catastrophe. The example of WAR BOOK is pertinent here. It is written, and reviewed in peacetime, to be used by all concerned when the war comes. The Secretary of the Ministry has to take it out and act as required, without much ado.

c) The situation on ground is that those who lived under a roof before the EQ devastation in the affected area are back under a roof. If any individual decided not to rebuild for his/her own reasons that is another matter. To that extent, the situation stands remedied. The quality of new house, in reality, or in individuals’ perception, could be better or worse than before. In terms of durability and seismic resistance, the affectees are certainly better off. This is a result of the fact that in the rural areas ERRA, SERRA and PERRA have been able largely to ensure that “Minimum Engineering Techniques” are applied in reconstruction.

d) The ERRA decision of providing uniform assistance package of Rs. 75,000 for a partially damaged house and 175,000 for fully destroyed house irrespective of its size/quality has worked as a kind of social leveler. Poorer people, who are a large majority, having sub-standard accommodation before the EQ, now have a better house while others with larger houses had to be content with smaller ones unless they could muster additional resources on their own. Many among the latter category insistently complained that the funds provided were too meager to meet the cost involved. They refused to recognize that the payment was assistance and not cost of reconstruction.

e) While on the subject of size of a house, if it is too small, it hurts all in the family. The women’s discomfort is far more, however, for lack of privacy, particularly in our cultural make up where they are unthinkingly discriminated against. Therefore, the house design should provide for at least 2 rooms.

f) In our environment, the policy of uniform assistance was perhaps the only workable option. However, it is not equitable. For future, a separate category could be introduced of villages with intrinsic disadvantage like remote areas with no/poor access roads, to cover the excessive transportation cost
compared to cities, towns and villages located nearby. Criteria for this purpose can be devised and announced for future use. A project to list such villages could also be initiated at district level after the criteria are decided.

g) It was a massive operation, and has been carried out by a new organization, having practically nothing like a system to rely on, no previous experience, precedents, procedures, SOPs etc. The devastation was unprecedented, the infrastructure including access roads was severely damaged, and danger of land sliding was ever present in addition to what had already taken place. In such a scenario, reaching all the affected persons as late as in 3-7 days can be condoned. For future, the readiness has to be much better.

h) The evidence indicates that the initial survey of damaged houses, although not perfect, was realistic to a large extent, and for each house the initial sum of Rs. 25,000 was paid to all those who were registered, quite swiftly. That is something that deserves appreciation.

i) There is evidence pointing to favoritism and corruption in the process, involving both, some of the officials and some of the beneficiaries who wanted a larger share than their due, in league with their locally influential supporters and/or officials. It has also been reported that in Battagram, some bankers refused to open the bank accounts required to encash the cheques and some others indulged in corruption by selling account-opening forms at high prices and demanding bribes for facilitating encashment of the cheques. The lesson learnt is greater transparency and accountability of all concerned including banks.

j) It has also been noted that in certain policy matters, there was lingering confusion. There was the issue of frequent changes in policy decisions as in the design of the new houses, and different understanding at a given time of ERRA officials and NGO staff assisting ERRA. There were serious communication lapses/delays. For example, it has been reported that the standards applied by different inspectors in regard to the quality of construction for allowing payment of the next tranch varied a great deal, from team to team, time to time and agency to agency. This lack of clarity and consistency had grave implications about the credibility of the whole process, created petty jealousies among the beneficiaries and encouraged corruption. The lesson learnt here is considered, firm and fast decision making, effective communications to all layers of the operational staff and effective internal control system.

k) The training of masons and awareness campaign for the owners about the Minimum Engineering Techniques could have been more intense than it was. There could also be a greater effort to motivate the owners to rebuild their houses themselves to the extent possible instead of depending on professional masons and labour. A wise policy would be to continue the training and awareness campaign unabated in all areas prone to disaster due to earthquakes, floods, cyclones, drought etc. as an ongoing effort. Research should be conducted as necessary and disaster preparedness of the people should be enhanced.
through education and awareness. Support of NGOs in this task will come in
handy and should be solicited. Sungi already has a program on these lines
and may consider making it broader and permanent part of its strategy.

5.2 Immediate relief in the aftermath of EQ

Having discussed the perceptions of the community on the subject of housing, which was
one of the more direct and personal consequences of the EQ, attention is now turned to
other matters. The responses to the questions included in the questionnaire on matters
related to provision of relief to the affectees are now presented.

Two questions have already been discussed in the context of housing, which are also
relevant to the provision of relief issue. To the question as to who reached the spot first,
46% named Army, 29% NGOs, 18% individuals and 7% local govt.

The other question was about the time taken by the first arriving helper, the response was
given in diagram 3.

Giving cumulative numbers for a better understanding of the situation, for 1% first help
arrived within 6 hours, for 13% within one day, for 49% within three days, for 77%
within 7 days, and for the remaining 23%, it took more than 7 days. This is not a
situation, which we should live with. For future, for the remotest of the villages, 24
hours should be the target of NDMA, the organization now charged with the
responsibility.

To the question as to whether they received support from NGOs, 91% answered in
affirmative. When asked to name them, the result was as given in diagram 6
Sungi tops the list, as it should because the sample was drawn from the villages covered by Sungi’s programs/activities. Sungi was undoubtedly the most active relief provider. The nature of relief is briefly mentioned in Chapter 1.

To the question about the nature of support given by NGOs, the response was as given in the diagram 7

The sense of the discussions with the community read with above response pattern is that Sungi was one of the first to reach and help in all necessary ways to survive and rehabilitate livelihoods. However, as the relief started arriving from other sources also, it was perhaps more than required in areas that were more accessible. It was pointed out by a Social Mobilizer that a large number of well meaning and enthusiastic individuals and organizations were sending/delivering relief items as they thought appropriate, mostly on their own. The effort was not coordinated and effective guidance was not available as to what was required where. It also was pointed out that most individuals and NGO workers unloaded the relief goods at “convenient” locations, some motivated by their desire to meet individual/team targets. This resulted in mal-distribution of the relief goods, glut of quite a few items in many areas, and shortage in others. Although fundamentally positive, but it was a free for all scenario. It resulted in considerable wastage. **Steps need to be taken in future to ensure better coordination between all relief agencies to achieve optimization of the resources arriving from the philanthropists motivated by humanitarian and patriotic sentiments. Wastage should be a perceived as a crime at all times, more so in emergencies.**
In the process, women were the worst sufferers for lack of privacy and glaring apathy towards their special needs. Same can be said about the children, families with disable persons and elders.

5.3 LIVELIHOODS

The questionnaire contained a number of questions on livelihood-related matters. Some of these, which related to cash grants, have been dealt with above under the headings “housing” and “Immediate Relief”. Others are now discussed to one such question, 12 % respondents confirmed that they received cash grants from the NGOs while 88 % did not.

The matter of payment of Rs. 25,000 by ERRA being taken as cash grant has been discussed above. ERRA paid a cash livelihood grant based on criteria that was intended to identify the ultra poor, the most vulnerable. One serious observation has been made by several participants of the meetings with the affectees in this regard. It has been stated that details were obtained from almost all but the grant of Rs.3,000 per month for a period of 6 months was given to very few and that too on the recommendations of the notables of the area including the politically active ones. It was alleged that this facility of livelihood grants to the vulnerable groups was distributed largely on considerations other than merit alone and raised questions of propriety, transparency and accountability. ERRA, in its Annual Review 2006-07 has reported that it was a WB funded livelihood support programme for 250,000 most vulnerable families. 750,000 “targeting forms” were collected and 261,000 families were paid. 25000 applications were accepted in grievance redressal process. The support was extended for further 6 months to 21,000 families, which were adjudged “most vulnerable” on the basis of new criteria. An amount of over Rs. Five billion was paid through this programme.

If past is good guide, in our environment, to manage any such programme is prone to gross misuse/mismanagement. No reliable database is available, there is an unfortunate general tendency of making false/exaggerated claims and then there is widely prevalent culture of making and accepting recommendations for the favourites without regard to merit or in return of personal favours in cash or kind. It is hard to say how reliable the process of selection was, however there are quite a few indicators to show that this money has not reached only the vulnerable and has been distributed inequitably. In a situation like this, the allegation of the Agency’s staff making a buck just cannot be brushed aside.

For future, solutions need to be found to provide grants to the most vulnerable transparently, objectively and equitably. NGOs like Sungi need to discuss this issue too in their community organizations’ meetings. They could motivate and assist the Village Committee to prepare database of the most vulnerable based on agreed criteria, which may be kept updated under the guidance and oversight of the NGO.

In response to the question about sources of income before the EQ, the response was as given in diagram 8
To another question about current sources of income, the responses were as in diagram 9.

There is no mentionable difference between the pre and post EQ pattern.

To a question about ownership of house, 85% said yes. About ownership of agricultural land, the response was as given in diagram 10.
To the question about the number of livestock owned, the response was as in **Diagram 11**

![Diagram 11](image)

**Diagram 11**

Asked to give their income levels before the EQ, the result was as in **Diagram 12**
It is quite obvious that bulk of the population is poor, some less than the others. About 12 \% only can be classified as middle class out of which a much smaller percentage could be termed as upper middle class.

To the question about number of dependents at the time of earthquake, the response was as given in diagram 13.
Asked about number of dependents now, the response was as in **diagram 14**

![Number of Dependents Now](image)

**Diagram 14**

The above two diagrams show that there is no major change in the pre and post EQ period. Maximum respondents fall in 6-8 category. This is yet another reflection of the extent of responsibility that the bread-earner has to shoulder. Looking at the income pattern, the poverty is clearly widespread.

Response to the question if the respondent was the only source of household income, is given in **diagram 15**

![Are you the only earning member](image)

**Diagram 15**
To yet another question about how many family members directly earn now, the response was as given in diagram 16.

Diagram 16

Comparing the two responses given above, there is a visible trend toward sharing the responsibility for effort to earn the livelihood with the head of family. Based on discussions with the community, this is partly on account of the economic pressure brought about by the disaster and considerably on social mobilization and awareness initiatives by various NGOs including Sungi. This is definitely a positive sign.

It was noted that the average family size before the earthquake was 8.1, which has come down to 7.7 now. The negative difference of 30 is the net attrition, the EQ being mainly responsible.

It is important to note that about half the population tills the land and they predominantly have fragmented holdings. A little less than half of them also rear some livestock. The remaining respondents have jobs and some do small business. In short, agriculture is the mainstay. Improvement in this sector can go a long way in ameliorating their economic plight. They need to be trained by experts and motivated to make the best use of this proud possession. The Village Committees could be prompted to move toward cooperative farming in the village or a cluster of villages, for the benefit of all.

5.4 SPECIAL PERSONS

22% families had special persons in their midst and out of them 7% had 2 special persons. This high percentage flags this as an issue. Needs of the differently able persons were not appropriately met, despite a number of initiatives. Social protection and gender
strategies of ERRA talk about this, but there were very few initiatives undertaken. Some very good programmes initiated by NGOs including Sungi were reported to be beneficial. No specific measures were ensured in housing designs for women and differently able persons.

5.5 GENDER ISSUES

To the question about widowed or divorced single women in the family, the response indicated a percentage as large as 25%. This partly explains the large size of families. This also underscores the need for greater gender awareness, women empowerment and confidence building through measures like social mobilization, education, awareness, skill training, enterprise development, facilitating products’ design and marketing etc. To another related question as to whether she was directly earning her livelihood, the response was that 5 out of 14 i.e. 36% were doing so. This indicates a considerably high level of empowerment keeping in view the fact that some of these women were elderly mothers living with their sons.

80% women were engaged in household work only while 20% also helped in agriculture or were using other skills for income generation. Asked about the income of women who directly earned, 16 out of 18 were making less than 30,000 per annum. One was in the 30,000-50,000 range and one over 150,000 per annum. These numbers point to the need for greater effort in the skills training, micro financing and support for making access to the market possible/easier. During discussions, women exhibited eagerness to learn skills and increase their personal incomes. The men, when directly questioned about their attitude, showed no reservations. It seems that the social mobilization efforts by the NGOs, particularly Sungi in the surveyed areas, have already achieved the important milestone of overcoming the traditional resistance in rural/conservative society to the women working to earn independent income.

Another indicator of change in attitude toward girls was the response to the questions about girls’ education. To a straight question as to whether they liked to send their girl offspring to schools, the response was 72 in affirmative and only 2 in the negative. To verbal query also, the response was overwhelmingly positive. Yet another set of questions about the number of girls of school going age and the number of girls actually going to school also corroborated this position. In fact, in quite a few families, 2, 3 or 4 girls were going to school. This is another positive development. Education among girls, over time, will bring about the change that Sungi and other NGOs are working for.

To another direct question as to whether they supported the idea of training the women for income generating activities/skill development, the answers were, again, overwhelmingly positive. 95 % supported the idea. Similarly, to a follow up question as to whether they wished to be supported for production and marketing of goods produced by the family, 95% said yes.

Yet another question was if the EQ had been a reason for the change in attitude towards women’s skill learning and earning livelihood. 94 % agreed.
In the course of group discussions with women, they raised the issue of being ignored and lack of attention to their special needs in a disaster situation, by the agencies providing relief. Some other women health related issues will be discussed while dealing with the health sector.

5.6 EDUCATION

The attitude toward education is positive. The situation in respect of girls is already given in the immediately previous section in the context of gender issues. In the case of boys, the attitude is positive. 80-90% boys of school going age, it is claimed, are actually going to schools. In the course of discussion, their eagerness to educate their children was obvious while they complained about the lack of facilities and unsatisfactory quality of schools and teaching.

The situation with reference to the available facilities is nowhere even close to the preparedness and aspirations of the community. Over 70% respondents agreed that at the time of EQ there was a primary school nearby (within one km) and at present 50% respondents agreed they have nearby schools. Rebuilding of schools that collapsed during EQ has not been completed in almost all cases according to the survey. In about two third cases, those are being rebuilt or are planned to be rebuilt on the existing site or nearby. The schools are nevertheless functional in transitional arrangements. Performance is directly dependent on one or two teachers that are supposed to be responsible. In some cases, the teachers are capable and committed to their task; however, in most they are not. There is widespread complaint in this respect.

The female respondents insisted that adequate and equal educational opportunities should be provided to girls.

The responsibility of rebuilding the schools and other educational institutions was, and is, of ERRA and its affiliates. The position reported in its Annual review for 2007-08 is that out of 5344 damaged educational institutions in the EQ hit area, 175 only had been completed by that year. In 1330 cases, tenders had been awarded from which it can be assumed that they are currently under construction. There could be many reasons for the extremely slow progress but the fact remains that the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase is clearly going to take much longer than the initial claims and promises by all those who mattered in the country. In light of discussions with the officials of the concerned agencies, it can be safely stated that a sense of urgency is missing. The EQ affected areas are being treated in the same easygoing manner as other developmental activities without regard to the fact that they were pushed back in time by that fateful event and should receive priority to restore status quo ante.

While on the subject of education, questions were asked about the involvement of children in sports and existence of playgrounds. Only 51 % said that their children got involved in sports activities. However, only 9% said that a playground was nearby. This important element needs to be incorporated in education facilities planning/rural development plans.

5.7 HEALTH
The situation with reference to health sector is almost the same as in education sector. The survey indicated that at the time of EQ, 42% respondents had a health facility (BHU/RHC/Dispensary) near their home (within one km). For 25% it was not near and for the remaining 33% there was no facility. As to the quality of the then existing facilities, only 25% respondents were satisfied and 75% termed it “Bad”.

ERRA, in its Annual Report 2007-08, reports that 588 facilities were either fully or partially damaged. ERRA decided not only to reconstruct but use this opportunity to rationalize and upgrade the healthcare. This approach led to the decision to reconstruct 307 improved facilities. The position at the end of FY 2007-08 was that 27 (9%) facilities had been completed, 79 (26%) were under construction while 77 (25%) were at planning stage and the remaining 124 (40%) were awaiting funding support from the Government or donors/sponsors. The comment made in respect of educational institutions about lack of a sense of urgency and inability to restore status quo ante apply equally to health sector.

As far as the perception of the community goes, the future may be rosy if one were to believe all that ERRA Annual Review says; however, the present is pathetic, almost inhuman in most remote areas. If there is a healthcare facility nearby, it is not adequately equipped, nor sufficiently staffed. More often than not, the attitude of the staff is not positive. If one has to travel, the distances are long, roads are in very bad shape, the village roads are non-existent and transport is not to be found. The villagers lament that they have to carry their sick on foot, and in many cases, the sick do not survive the travel. If the sick person is lucky, enough to reach there, those facilities are overcrowded, understaffed and ill equipped; and proper medical attention is hard to get. If admitted, the family members have to live in the open outside the hospital for they have nowhere else to go. They also have to, somehow, find cash to meet emergency needs as the hospital is not in a position to arrange all tests and give all medicines.

Among those who suffer, the plight in respect of women and reproductive health is worse. The birth attendants, who may be available in the village or in a nearby village are practically untrained, and simply cannot handle any complications.

The pace at which the concerned Government agencies are moving and the funding that is being provided does not give any hope that even in a distant future, there would be a major improvement in healthcare.

5.8 INFRASTRUCTURE (ROADS, BRIDGES, POWER AND TELECOM FACILITIES, WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS)

The needs of the affectees as far as infrastructure is concerned are self-evident and so are their perceptions. Yet, it is worthwhile to give their response to two questions on this subject. To a question asking for the areas which should have receive more attention, the response pattern was as given in diagram 17.
Diagram 17

To the other question seeking to know as to what should be done for complete rehabilitation/reconstruction, the response pattern was as given in diagram 18.
When asked during group discussions about their most urgent needs, educational and healthcare facilities, skills development for men and women and enterprise development, roads and water supply were mentioned by a vast majority.

This part of the survey practically concludes the quest for a comprehensive list of the issues of the affectees in their own perception. However, before presenting that list it would be in fitness of things to state briefly the progress in restoration and development of infrastructure. For this purpose, once again the Annual Review of ERRA for 2007-08 is being relied upon, along with a number of progress report of NGOs including Sungi.

5.9 PROGRESS IN RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE

ROADS

Initial estimated damage was 6305 km of roads, 172 bridges and 143 culverts. It was realized that “much of the reported damage required minor repairs”, and ERRA decided
“to focus on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of major roads only with improved specifications and geometry” ERRA prepared 233 bridge/road schemes, out of which 23 have been constructed and construction on 95 schemes was in progress. The target was to complete all schemes by 2010. The ERRA report does not say as to who were assigned the task of the so-called minor repairs and what progress did they make.

WATER AND SANITATION (WATSAN)

ERRA reports that out of a total of 4788 WATSAN schemes, 1754 had been completed and 1219 were at construction stage.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

In this sector ERRA has reported not only full restoration but substantial increase in capacity, connections etc. For this reason, no one mentioned telecommunications as an issue during interaction with the community.

POWER

In this sector, the complaint of the affectees has been of delay in restoration after the event. Now the power has been restored and they are complaining of high fixed charge and non-installation of meters. ERRA has plans to upgrade the system and also ensure reinstallation of meters.
Chapter 6

Role of ERRA and its Affiliates, SERRA and PERRA

ERRA was established on October 24, 2005 as an autonomous body at the Federal level with the objective to ensure the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the areas devastated by the EQ. It has two affiliates, PERRA and SERRA, at the provincial and state levels and District Reconstruction Units in the 8 districts. The mandate of ERRA is policy planning, financing, project approval, quality control, monitoring, and evaluation. At its apex is the ERRA Council headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. ERRA Board, chaired by Chairman, ERRA with quite a few senior Government officials, is responsible for implementation of approved programmes, projects and policy decisions of the Council, as well as day-to-day operational matters. Similarly, PERRA and SERRA Steering Committees include senior Government officials. With a civilian chairperson, ERRA’s is practically headed by an in-service Army General.

According to the ERRA website, its functional sectors are as follows:

i) **Direct Outreach** covering Housing, Livelihood and Social Protection.

ii) **Social Services** covering Health, Education, Water Supply and Sanitation.

iii) **Public Infrastructure** covering Governance, Power Generation, Telecommunication, Transportation and Tourism.

iv) **Cross Cutting Themes** covering Disaster Risk Reduction, Environmental Safeguards and Gender Equality.

This study is revolving around the affectees’ perceptions, which have been analyzed in the last chapter in some detail. The issues raised by them and discussed in respect of which ERRA had a role to play includes Rural housing, Livelihood grants, healthcare, education, water supply & sanitation, public buildings, power generation, telecommunication and transportation(roads).

In the context of remaining functions, the following points are noteworthy.

i) In Muzaffarabad city, the amount of assistance for housing has been paid in lump sum against a written commitment from the recipient that the ERRA designing would be adhered to. It has been assumed that the local authorities will ensure that they actually do. The capacity of the local authorities in this respect is a question
mark. An easy solution has been adopted to enhance progress and the objective of ensuring seismic resistant construction might have been compromised to a considerable extent in that process.

ii) In the livelihood sector, besides the cash grants, which have been discussed in the last chapter, none of the affectees in the areas covered by field study made any mention of ERRA contribution except, a number of livelihood initiatives by NGOs, and UN agencies. Same is the position regarding Social Protection. ERRA claims to have taken some initiative in these two sectors but the outreach seems to be limited. Some of these sectors have been formally adopted more for window dressing reasons.

iii) In the case of cross cutting theme of gender equality, it was noted that in provision of relief goods, this was almost completely neglected by the army. NGOs however, did include women in relief assistance and gender specific programs were undertaken. If some specific initiatives have been taken by ERRA, those do not appear to have reached the communities covered by this study.

While credit is well deserved of moving fast in the early months after the disaster and bringing order to the chaos, many things could have been done more efficiently and more transparently. A DFID Fiduciary and Corruption Risk Assessment of ERRA in November 2007 found a number of weaknesses in the way ERRA was operating. It concluded that on a four-point scale of High, Substantial, Moderate or Low, the present overall fiduciary risk was SUBSTANTIAL. Again, on the same four-point scale, the corruption risk was assessed as SUBSTANTIAL. This independent assessment gives credence to the allegations of financial mismanagement and corruption.

The current slow pace of progress in the physical works as brought out in the last chapter does not lend credibility to ERRA’s claim that it will complete its mandate in 2011. One should keep his fingers crossed.
## Chapter 7

### Major INGOs / NGOs Involved / Collaborating in 3R

Following is the representative list of INGOs and NGOs that have been involved/collaborating in the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the study area. The list also indicates Sungi’s partnerships.

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<th>S #</th>
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This, by no means is a comprehensive listing. There were many others but for the present purpose serves the purpose.

The Government agencies like ERRA have benefited from the involvement of these non-governmental organizations not only in terms of funding but also from the wealth of experience, expertise and technical knowledge that they bring with them. In the case of national NGOs like Sungi, the external knowledge base when combined with their own knowledge base of the local conditions enriches them to the ultimate advantage of affectees.

The INGOs obviously bring in substantial funds and enter into contractual arrangements with the local ones or the Government agencies. In some cases, the terms are equitable and the parties are equal partners. In yet others, the INGO obtains Government cover but operates in the field almost independently. In others, local agency or NGO operates practically as a contractor for the INGO under its control and oversight. Quite obviously, equal partnership is the most desirable way to go. The national body should share decision-making, operational work and responsibility with the INGO. This is an arrangement, which produces most synergy.

An important issue is meaningful coordination between the operations of all these bodies. In a disaster scenario, and even in normal times, there is substantial duplication of work, uneven territorial spread of relief/other support activities resulting in excess in some areas and shortage in others, resulting in avoidable wastage and misery.

The NGOs social mobilization initiatives are also in certain communities resulting in formation of multiple councils and community organizations, in the same village by a number of different organizations, which is a waste of effort and funds, and can be easily avoided by greater interaction and coordination among the Government agencies and NGOs.
Chapter 8

Issues of Earthquake Affectees

The issues of the EQ affectees have been identified and discussed already in this report. The summary below presents the issues in a prioritized manner according to the affectees’ perception.

• Rehabilitation of approach roads
• Rehabilitation of WATSAN infrastructure
• Functional girls schools at primary level within one km
• More schools close to communities
• Middle and high schools within reasonable/conveniently approachable distance particularly for girls
• Functionality of existing health facilities and new health facilities in remote areas to take care of women-specific health issues in particular
• Livelihood related support particularly training for skill development, technical training/advice in agriculture and livestock rearing on continuous basis to enable greater production, help in organizing collective buying of seeds, micro financing, enterprise management, support in marketing local products etc. The women showed great enthusiasm in this regard.
• Capacity building for disaster sensitive housing reconstruction and other structures
• Settlement of outstanding payment issues by ERRA without further delay and extension of deadline
• Full rehabilitation of power system including installation of meters
• Provision of sport/extra curricular activities for children, both girls and boys
• Provision of land to the persons rendered landless because of land sliding and living in the hazardous areas.
• Rehabilitation of irrigation channels and provision of water and sanitation facilities
• The women participants in the discussions emphasized, over and over again, that while all the physical issues are important, their insistence was on enhancing their capacity through training of skills, education, awareness programs for the community in respect of their rights, and special needs and problems. They also wanted more work in micro financing, market access and organizing groups.

• There is a need to address specific needs of persons with disabilities, elderly and the most vulnerable

• Ultrapoor specific programmes are needed to be initiated to improve their livelihood and reducing disparities

• There is a need to address disparities at the household and at the community particularly those of the patriarchal origin

• There is a need to revitalize natural resources for improved livelihoods of the poor

• Measures are needed to be undertaken to safeguard environment
Chapter 9

Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

9.1 GOVERNMENT RELATED

Issues to be addressed

• There was a critical institutional vacuum when the 2005 tragedy struck. No one was sufficiently prepared to meet the challenge of disaster management at any level of government - local, provincial or federal. This crisis of governance persists as was proven by subsequent calamities/crises including the latest IDP crisis in NWFP. NDMA has since been established under the NDMA Ordinance, 2007 but the PDMAs and DDMAs are yet to find their feet. It is time to act and establish operating mechanism/institutions on ground.

• The Government relies rather too heavily on foreign donors to address the immediate issues of any disaster and tends to, routinely, seek foreign help and depend on NGOs for the relief work. The resources generated against such appeals are normally inadequate since the Government agencies cannot come up with a credible plan to support cost estimates. This approach is, obviously, not a substitute of state institutions being in a position of preparedness for disasters. Interestingly, in relation to the latest issue of IDPs of NWFP, a news article reported that the Prime Minister declined to establish another organization for IDPs and directed the Military to support relief operations. This means that there was an attempt to make yet another disaster management agency notwithstanding the presence of NDMA and local government in which the Government has invested heavily. There is a need to bring an end to such unhealthy practices through energizing social accountability process.

• ERRA in particular and most other players in disaster management, generally speaking, did not follow the guiding principles for recovery strategy, formulated by the international development partners. Some of them are also not following sphere standards and accountability principles, and even if following these area not aware about them.

• ERRA was found wanting in the area of consistency of policies and strategies and could not demonstrate considered, firm, and fast decision making with effective communication to all layers of its operational machinery. Its control systems were also weak. These are minimum expectations from such organization.
• The help/relief reached too late, in some cases after 3 weeks. Delay in search, rescue, evacuation work caused a large number of deaths in the disaster affected areas. There have been many instances where helipads in less affected areas became operational compared to other more affected areas. This is something that could have been prevented but for the inexperience of the agencies in dealing with disaster of such a magnitude.

• Specific and effective programs are needed for all vulnerable groups because they are generally neglected in disaster situations.

• Solutions need to be found to provide grants to the most vulnerable groups objectively and equitably. Propriety, transparency and accountability are important in all spending and perhaps more in criteria based cash distribution.

• Transparency and accountability in disaster management have been a question mark. The term “disaster economy” has gained currency to describe the fact that huge money changed hands in a short period and individuals and groups have made millions out of it through dishonest means. This is unpardonable and a grave issue to be reckoned with. The need for systems to ensure transparency, and accountability can not be overemphasized

• The quality of construction of the public buildings has proven to be inferior to private ones. Many of them crumbled while the private buildings of seemingly similar type of construction survived the shock resulting in large number of deaths, mostly of children. The reasons are not hard to find. Without any detailed inquest, one can point to widespread corruption, technical incompetence of the staff and the contractors, use of sub-standard material, poor supervision etc. **Seriousness of this matter needs to be realized by all concerned and corrective steps taken.**

• Sense of urgency has to be carried forward even after the initial phase of relief is over. It is not visible in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure and amenity buildings like schools, healthcare facilities etc.

• Inaccuracies in initial master record create huge problems afterwards for the affectees and create avenues of corruption.

• The awareness campaign in respect of disaster resistant construction helped in improving the quality of reconstruction. This campaign must continue in all areas prone to disaster due to earthquake, floods, cyclone, drought etc. as an ongoing effort.

• An effective mechanism is required to ensure adequate supply of the required construction material, at affordable prices, in the aftermath of a calamity.

• The Government institutions have the tendency of taking decisions supposedly for the welfare of the people but without consulting with them. This leads to gaps in decisions resulting in waste, and public frustration, to say the least. It is undesirable
and undemocratic in all situations, most of all in a disaster scenario and must be avoided.

**Recommendations**

- It is high time that the civilian state institutions are strengthened and enabled to perform their functions as enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and is a norm in any democratic country. The long-standing tendency to call upon the armed forces to perform civilian tasks rather too often is the root cause of the pathetic condition of the civilian institutions. In the context of disaster management, the institutions envisaged in the NDMA Ordinance 2007 must be made functional at provincial and local levels on top priority basis. A sense of urgency is the need of the hour. They should be provided with adequate resources and systems have to be put in place to ensure quality performance along with transparency and accountability. As provincial governments are involved, decisive action will be required at the political level to make rapid progress.

- One of the first tasks of NDMA, PDMAs and DDMAs must be disaster risk mapping of the areas, and organizing early warning systems. Alongside this, the resource mapping is necessary. Equipped with these two basic inputs, contingency plans/short term mitigation plans should be prepared immediately and plans should be made in other areas included in their mandate under the law. In other words, these bodies should carry out local and national assessment of risks from natural/other hazards, to be integrated into development policies and plans.

- The Civil Defense Organization, the Boy Scouts movement and the Girl Guides Movement used to be active in the fifties and sixties. They had the important element of voluntary citizen involvement in emergencies in an organized manner. In normal times, the participating citizens used to receive training and made aware of the organizational dos and don’ts, which they would normally follow in the disaster situation. There was an element of personal pride in performing these voluntary activities. NDMA should take it upon itself to resurrect these organizations as part of their overall strategy. This will help keep cost low and involve the people.

- On the pattern of War Book, a book of standing instructions should be developed for action on automatic basis by all concerned in the event of a disaster.

- ERRA (since it is in the lead on the subject) needs to trigger/speed up the remaining process of implementation along with the other relevant Government agencies and complete the rehabilitation and reconstruction work as fast as possible.

- ERRA should resolve the issues relating to Red Zone and reconstruction at alternate sites urgently. The Master Plan must take final shape now, and workable strategies should be adopted to achieve the core objectives, without causing avoidable hardship to any person. It is important that meaningful consultation with the affectees be part of the process, they being the most important stakeholder.
• Proper healthcare for all is a dream, which is somewhere far in the future. The concerned departments may consider expanding the use of mobile dispensaries as a short/medium-term measure. If it is well conceived and well organized, it will have a positive impact. This initiative can be taken in partnership with one or more INGO/NGO. It must be emphasized that these mobile facilities should be specially equipped for the women and children specific health issues.

• It must be ensured as part of future strategy that NDMA and all other bodies playing a role in disaster management adhere to the guiding principles for recovery strategy, sphere standards and accountability principles.

• Coordination between all relief agencies must be ensured by NDMA to achieve optimization of scarce resources and avoid wastage. In this regard, the partnership between the NDMA / PDMA / DDMA and civil society needs to be built and strengthened. The local communities need to be brought into the center of this disaster preparedness strategy.

• In future disaster situations, the target of the disaster management bodies should be to reach all affected people at the earliest and in any case within 24 hours.

• The agency(ies) creating the initial master record of the affectees must be aware of the importance of its accuracy for processing later and ensure the same if miscarriage of justice, delays, inconvenience to the affectees, corruption, complaints and cost of operation are to be minimized.

• ERRA and its affiliates do have a complaint redressal mechanism in place yet a large number of complaints are persisting. They will be well advised to decide/resolve, once for all, the disputed cases/complaints on urgent basis through a higher level/third party transparent, quasi-judicial process, which should be adequately publicized. This is imperative to distinguish the deserving from the greedy and correct the wrongs that may have been committed by the officials. Not all complaints will be correct but quite a few may be. These should not be allowed to fester and pollute the environment.

• In all policies, programs, and actions gender equality and environment must be a cross-cutting theme. There is a need to ensure implementation of social protection, gender and environment strategy.

9.2 CIVIL SOCIETY/NGO/DONORS RELATED ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Agriculture is the mainstay of majority of the population in the affected area and improvements in this sector can go a long way in improving livelihood ameliorating the condition of the people. They need to be provided technical advice in all related areas including kitchen gardening and obtaining more crops/production/yield to enable them to make the best of this proud possession. The Village Committees may be motivated to take initiative for collective buying of good seeds and, may be,
cooperative farming in the long run. This will require a long-term engagement with them.

- The other most important area of support that can bring about a change faster than any other is the provision of skills training to the men and women. Women have exhibited strong interest in this empowering activity. This element of the NGO programs needs to intensify as much as possible.

- Crises/disasters bring out the best in most human beings. They act as catalysts and influence the mindset. The direction this change takes depends largely upon how the state and the people around the stricken people conduct themselves. One visible impact of EQ was greater willingness of the affectees to accept women’s right to learning and earning. The social mobilization and awareness efforts by NGOs have consolidated these positive changes in the mindset. This work must be intensified.

- Women are motivated and need to be able to earn independent income. The community’s acceptance in this respect now exists. Intensified efforts are needed to provide skills training, micro financing, assistance in enterprise management, access to market etc.

- There is now almost universal realization of need to educate their children and acceptance of girls’ education. The women are now very vocal about having adequate capacity for education of girls being available in the community. There is a general complaint of poor quality of teaching. This change in mindset can be consolidated by social mobilization initiatives and making educational facilities accessible to the communities.

- The proportion of special persons has been found to be high. As many as 22% families have them. Specific initiatives need to be taken to help them lead normal life as far as possible and contribute to the national economy.

- NGO’s may take it upon themselves to continue the training and awareness campaign about Minimum Engineering Techniques in consultation with ERRA, SERRA and PERRA as well as NDMA/PDMA, as part of its Disaster Preparedness programme. They may also work to improve the documentation and publicity material in terms of contents and user-friendliness. In the cities, they may work for developing an appropriate are specific disaster resistant “Building Codes” and their due compliance by all. This is an area in which both the local Governments and the homeowners have to be persuaded to ensure that buildings are calamity resistant to the extent humanly possible. This effort will certainly save many lives in a future. In this respect, women have an important role and there is need to increase their awareness also.

There is also need to revise the building codes of public and private buildings to provide special provisions for differently able, women, children and elders.
• The provision of clean drinking water is a basic need of the communities. It is directly linked to their health and well-being. The relevant departments could make a beginning by ensuring, as a first step, reliable water testing at regular intervals in respect of all communities. In each case, it may be possible to find low cost solutions to improve the quality until a proper water supply scheme is implemented. It will also serve to increase awareness inducing the people to take precautions at their own level.

• There is evidence of dependency syndrome growing and self-pride diminishing in certain minds. They cannot be blamed however. If a large number of NGOs provided relief goods and now the school is being built by one INGO and the health facility by another INGO, this negative change in mindset is a logical corollary. This is direct impact of failure of state institutions to perform. NGO’s awareness programs must counter this unhealthy trend by evoking national pride, and belief in personal and collective potential.

• The partnership between donors and the local partners works best if there is a relationship of mutual trust, and equal authority and responsibility with operating mechanisms to ensure transparency in operations instead of an employer/contractor like arrangements. All parties may want to avoid this in future.

• Disasters require swift action. The donors have to follow their normal time-consuming SOPs and, if not relaxed, they work as a bottleneck. They would fulfill their humanitarian objectives better if they work more proactively in view of the need of the situation.
Chapter 10

Recommendations for Sungi

Sungi is already operating a large number of programs, which, amazingly, cover practically all aspects relevant to the communities’ social and cultural development. One is hard placed to make a meaningful addition. The concept of Women Friendly Spaces has gained ground and that is an excellent platform to bring about gender equity and empowerment. The programmes conducted here are diverse, focusing on many aspects of human and democratic rights, health, education, skills training, Islam and social taboos, community organizational work, assisting differently-abled persons(women) adult literacy, tuition for girls, library facility, study circles covering issues like rape status of women in Islam, domestic violence, inheritance, child marriage, dowry, child abuse, child rights, divorce etc. Income generation and networking initiatives are also a part of the program. Targeting the ultra-poor through household based planning approach proved to be a very successful approach and Sungi had integrated this in its overall strategy.

Sungi is working now for some years on community-based Disaster Management Programme in an effort to build disaster resilient communalities, a strong advocacy initiative in an important direction.

“A typical story is about Khalil ur Rahman. He is a carpenter living with his parents, wife and twelve-year-old son. He lost his toolkit in the earthquake. After the earthquake, his only way to access carpentry tools was to borrow them from others. This significantly decreased his productivity. Sungi provided Khalil with a new tool kit and business support. As Khalil states: “I used to borrow tools from others, but it made me feel bad to have to ask for tools. I was not able to get them for more than 10 days a month. Now I can work for 25 days a month and am earning 500 rupees a day from my carpentry business. Thanks to Sungi for saving me from the hurt of borrowing, and supported me in increasing my income”
Sungi, in essence, is striving for CHANGE in the masses’ mindset and the way they are governed. It has made headway in the areas it is focusing on. However, there is long way to go and then Pakistan is a sprawling country beyond these districts. This will have to be a perpetual, unending struggle for the present mindset has crystallized over the whole length of history. Never in the past have the rights of the common man been open-mindedly recognized in our part of the world. There always were the rulers and the ruled, the Rajas and the Parja, the kings and the subjects. Sungi is engaged in a revolutionary struggle through peaceful means.

All the same, based on the field survey, the interactions with the Sungi staff as well as communities and review of published material about Sungi activities, it can be safely said that Sungi has an excellent understanding of the needs of the communities. It has taken a large variety of initiatives to achieve the desired outcomes including advocacy, social mobilization of communities, training for skill development, women empowerment/gender issues, natural resource management, awareness campaigns, disaster preparedness steps/trainings etc. etc. It also has been taking research, benchmarking initiatives, and publishing reports, which is a substantive addition to limited literature available on the issues. It monitors all activities closely and the management is perpetually in a self-assessment mode, the hallmark of a dynamic organization. Not many areas of concern have escaped Sungi’s attention although there could be questions of adequacy.

Sungi’s deep involvement in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of EQ hit areas, woven around social mobilization programs is showing results. The communities are walking out of the age-old prejudices, ultra conservatism and lack of self-confidence. The efforts need to be accentuated to achieve results faster.

Sungi is gender sensitive organization and ensures gender mainstreaming in all its programmes, which is also evident from its work in earthquake relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction programs.

10.1 Affectees Perceptions

It must be placed on record at this stage that in the course of personal interviews of the affectees, 91 % reported that the community had a Tanzeem (village committee) to identify and raise community issues. 18 % thought those were very active, 61% voted for active and 21% partly active. Similarly, 18 % were very happy about their performance, 65% satisfied and 17 % partly satisfied.

10.2 Recommendations about Sungi Strategies

- To begin with, Sungi may consider all that has been recommended above with reference to NGOs and Civil Society for expanding its noble work.

- Sungi’s rights based approach to empower communities as the core strategy is expected to bear fruit in time. However, in designing interventions, Sungi may give appropriate weight to a concomitant aspect: the respect for rights of other individuals,
own community, other communities, and the law of the land. In the community debates, the result should always not be a list of what the Government and others should be doing. There should always be a section about what each individual in the community and the community should be doing individually and collectively.

- Currently, Sungi’s focus is on ultra poor, the vulnerable groups, gender and the rural community development. This is well and good. However, the youth focus is perhaps being neglected. The young people from poor, lower middle and middle classes studying in run-of-the-mill higher secondary schools and colleges are the ones who, if mobilized, can hasten the process of social change in the desired direction. Programs may be developed to engage them with the central goal to convince them of their personal capacity/potential, boost their self-confidence, motivate them to greater personal effort and achievement, aiming to empower them and turning them to be the pallbearers of change in the society that Sungi is striving to bring about. This is empowerment through awareness of one’s capacity to achieve, the self-belief, notwithstanding the depressing environment.

- There are locally influential persons within the communities who can, and do, influence thinking of the community. Among them are local political/tribal/Biradri leaders, Government officials and those who control more resources like the big property owners including feudals/waders/landlords. Besides them, however, there are teachers and the local religious leaders like Imams of the local mosque who influence the local population’s mindset. It would be fair to assume that, except the teachers, a vast majority of others would be resistant to the work Sungi is doing for the simple reason that it encourages people to think and act freely. It wants to empower them. To ignore these groups will not reduce their resistance. They should be engaged in suitable ways with a view to address their misgivings and negative perceptions. The extent of success achieved in this endeavor will be directly proportional to reduction in the resistance and much faster achievement of outcomes. To illustrate, the teachers and imams from some neighboring communities may be sent on carefully planned study tours to bigger cities. The activity will broaden their vision and provide a relaxed environment in which sensitive issues could be freely discussed. If the Imam is won over, a major impediment is overcome. This suggestion is by way of example. One could think of many other similar interventions at a tactical level. But engagement of all these actors shall be done in way that it is used to empower the poor and marginalized segments of society and not to further empower the powerful. Sungi’s programmes to target the ultrapoor and integrating these in regular mobilization strategy proved to be a success, and needs to be replicated.

- Sungi may adopt on permanent basis the awareness program for disaster preparedness in all its manifestations for it will save lives, livelihoods and properties in a future calamity.

- The women and most vulnerable groups are badly neglected during crisis. Sungi could initiate maintenance of a local database of the most vulnerable in the villages, which may be kept updated for use when necessary, by the Village Councils under Sungi’s oversight/guidance.
• Sungi may examine the cost of traveling by its staff (including cost of their time) and the actual delivery time as a critical criterion while evaluating the efficacy of its activities. May be, with change in emphasis and strategies, more can be delivered/achieved at less cost. Reduced visibility of staff in high profile vehicles will also reduce the oft-made criticism/perception that the NGOs spend more money on vehicles than the task that they claim to be doing, or that they have an axe of their own to grind. This shall be overcome by establishing offices in the remote areas, again keeping in mind the operation costs.

• Sungi is well aware and tries to overcome the syndrome of “development tourisms” and its participatory approaches to spend more time with the communities need to be further strengthened. There is a need for staff to spend more time in the villages and increasing individual household visits and avoiding exclusion of poor and remote hamlets in the villages. There is also a need to promote a culture of coordination at the grassroots level and Sungi’s emphasis to influence other NGOs/government to work with the existing VCs instead of forming new ones shall be further promoted.

• The number of committees that are being promoted for formation in communities should be closely and critically reviewed to ensure that additional committees and paper work are actually enhancing the desired outcomes, and not just increasing the activities/outcomes numerically to the credit of a staff member.

• Focus on outcomes should outweigh the number of activities. To ensure that, periodic independent assessment/validation is advisable.

• Last but certainly not the least; continuous capacity building of the staff cannot be over emphasized. This must be given due priority, particularly in rights based approaches and facilitation skills, gender mainstreaming and accountability.

• Sungi is member of Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), International and intends to get its certification. This is important to further strengthen accountability in humanitarian and disaster management programmes.

• Sungi had developed a robusts humanitarian response mechanism and struggling to promote community based disaster management at UC and district level, which need to be continued and further strengthened.

• There is a need to develop a strong advocacy campaign involving other civil society organizations and engaging policy makers and administration to strengthen the government disaster management system, as per National Disaster Management Ordinance 2007.
Terms of References for Research Study
“Issues of 2005 Earthquake Affected Communities”

Research Study “Issues of the 2005 Earthquake Affected Communities”

1. Background

A high intensity earthquake with 7.6 on Richter scale struck the NWFP, AJK and federal capital Islamabad on October 08, 2005 at 08:52 AM., which caused heavy losses to human lives, property and infrastructures in the districts of Abbottabad, Mansehra, Batagram in Hazara division and Shangla in Swat. Similarly, Muzafarabad, Bagh and Rawalakot districts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) were amongst the worst affected areas of the country. Especially women and children were amongst the worst affected.

Sungi has considerable experience in humanitarian response, where Sungi proactively provided relief assistance to affectees during various disasters of 2004 and 2005, especially during the earthquake-2005 relief operations. During all these relief operations, Sungi worked with the support of various partners including NOVIB, Norwegian Embassy, Oxfam GB, UNDP, World Vision International and Swiss Development Cooperation.

In response to the earthquake 2005, there were a number of national and international organizations, which worked for humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives in all over the earthquake affected areas.

Limited financial and human resources, lack of effective preparedness for humanitarian assistance and weak capacities of the government and community are some of the major factors, which contributed for miseries of the earthquake 2005 affected communities.

2. Purpose, Objectives & Scope of the Study

The core purpose of the study is to determine what had been achieved because of humanitarian response, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction work by various stakeholders; what remains to be accomplished according to the affectees, and what are the key lessons learnt. The stakeholders include the Government agencies and local, national, international NGOs. The study will conclude with recommendations to be considered for future planning and implementation. It, however, is limited to the working areas of Sungi Development Foundation.
Objectives of the study are:

The study will focus on the following specific objectives in the Sungi’s Working area:

1. To assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in rehabilitation and reconstruction
2. To assess local governments’ role for rehabilitation of earthquake 2005 affectees.
3. To assess whether ERRA’s policies and practices on ground are relevant and effective in communities’ perspectives.
4. To assess immediate outcomes of work done/interventions carried out during 2005-2009 in the lives/well being of the earthquake affectees because of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives.
5. To assess current broader issues/ problems of the communities and their priority livelihoods needs for next 5 years.

3. Scope:

As far as geographical extent is concerned, this study will focus on four districts including Abbottabad, Mansehra, and Battagram in NWFP and Muzaffarabad in AJK. While from the contents point of view it will consider the issues and needs of earthquake affectees, intended and unintended changes in local and national capacities among different sections of the population, including how stakeholders were able to leverage their engagement with existing local and national capacities to contribute to such changes. The assessment will also address the contextual constraints and opportunities in achieving these changes.

The study will focus to identify future issues/needs, which would be falling under the overall preview of Sungi’s various programmes like Advocacy, Human & Democratic Rights, Sustainable Livelihoods, Community Productive Infrastructure, Education, Health etc.

4. Expected Outputs of the Study

- A comprehensive document providing a snapshot of the roles of government and non government organizations in response to earthquake 2005; identifying the current issues and problems of EQ effected communities and their un-attended needs and provide practical recommendations to cater for future needs of EQ effected communities
- A published report of the study for wider dissemination.

5. Methodology of the Study

It is visualized that the methodology will encompass a number of methods including:

- Secondary data reviews
- Stakeholders’ interviews (Men and women beneficiaries, community and civil society groups, local organizations, local and national government, private
institutions, international agencies etc) based on a structure and semi-structured questionnaire that will gather both quantitative and qualitative information.

- **Participatory Meetings & Discussions** both at village & union council levels by selecting about 8 union councils from the 33 working union councils and by selecting 1 sample village from each union council, and hence by selecting around 10 households from each selected village for detailed questionnaire survey and analysis.

- Analysis will be both **qualitative and quantitative**. Examples of good/best practice will be noted and a comparative analysis made of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts leading to positive changes in capacities across communities, institutions.

6. **Cross Cutting Dimensions to be considered for the Study:**

   1. Communities’ Livelihoods Framework based on Sustainable Livelihoods Approach.
   2. Accountability Mechanisms at all levels Ensured.
   3. Consideration of gender aspects and vulnerable groups at all levels.

7. **Required Expertise of Consultant**

   The consultant will represent a balance of skills and experience including the following: Substantial evaluation experience

   - Experience of humanitarian response and recovery programmes
   - Familiarity with the region
   - Experience of working with government departments
   - Experience of working with local organizations (civil societies and NGOs)
   - Experience of capacity assessment and building
   - Gender balance and demonstrable experience in integrating gender considerations
   - Experience in beneficiary consultation, surveys, and conducting focus groups
   - Excellent spoken and written communication skills in English
   - Sectoral technical expertise (e.g. health, water, education, socio-economics)

8. **Tentative Time Schedules & Funds:**

   The exact timeframe for this assignment will be negotiated in line with the proposal submitted by the successful consultant. Sungi foresees that the study could be completed within a period of 30 consulting days and is expecting the assignment to start by 10 May 2009 and to be completed by 15th of June 2009.

9. **Funds Disbursement:** The funds would be released to the consultant in accordance with the agreed schedule of payment with the selected consultant.
PUBLICATIONS:

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CURCH WORLD SERVICE-PAKISTAN / AFGHANISTAN: ACT International: DURYOG NIVARAN- South Asian Network for Disaster Risk Reduction: RECOVERY DELAYED RECOVERY DENIED, Studying Political Economy of Earthquake-2005 Recovery and Reconstruction in Pakistan,


ERRA: Block se Ghar Bananay Walo Kay Liye ERRA Ki Taraf se Zaroori Pegham, June 2008,


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GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, CABINET DIVISION, DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RELIEF CELL: The West Pakistan National Calamities (Prevention and Relief) ACT, 1958.

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SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: AMJAD NAZEE & ZEENIA MASOOD, POLICY ADVOCACY PROGRAMME: The Role Of Local Government In Disaster Management, Dialogue with the Community and Local Government Representatives, Analysis & Policy Recommendations.

SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: Women Friendly Spaces, Quarterly Progress Report, April-June 2008

SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: Outcomes Report run on May 29, 2009


SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: SUNGI Strategic Plan (SSP) II, Mid Term Review, March 08.

SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: SUNGI Nama, July-December 2005.

SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: SUNGI Nama, January-February 2009.

SUNGI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: submitted to the CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY: Final Narrative Report - Sustainable Livelihoods Rehabilitation in Four Earthquake-affected Union Councils in Abbottabad, December 2008.


WEBSITES:

The World Bank: www.worldbank.org/pk
Asian Development Bank: www.adb.org/Pakistan
Sungi Development Foundation: www.sungi.org
ERRA: wwwerra.gov.pk/
NDMA: ndma.gov.pk/
ALNAP: www.alnap.org/
DFID: www.dfid.gov.uk/

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Ms. Shabana Kausar Zonal Coordinator, Mansehra
Mr. Niaz Ahmad Zonal Coordinator, Battagram
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Amjad Mehmood Assistant Coordinator, Health Programme
Mr. Akhtar Zaib Field Engineer, Abbottabad
Mr Adil Field Coordinator, Abbottabad
Meeting with the Field Coordinators, Mansehra  
Meeting with Field Coordinators, Muzaffarabad

**Other Organizations:**

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